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INTRODUCTION
The special services of the Soviet Union served the interests of 
a totalitarian state, not only by fighting all views which disagreed 
with it and blocking channels of communication with the outside 
world, but also by contributing to the implementation of its for-
eign policy (i.e. by creating the conditions for its implementation). 
To this end they used a variety of methods: propaganda, decep-
tion and sabotage, and even the physical liquidation of political 
opponents. These operations acquired the collective, euphemis-
tic name of ‘active measures’. This term justified the aggressive 
policy of the expansion of Communism, which was subjugated to 
a long-term strategy of psychological-ideological combat.
The belief that Russia lost its capacity to engage in this kind of 
long-term action together with the fall of Communism is incor-
rect. A more thorough analysis shows that ‘the Marxist scientific 
worldview’ was very quickly replaced by a ‘geopolitical scientific 
worldview’ and, as during the Cold War, this concept was raised 
to the rank of an official doctrine of foreign and security policy. 
This geopolitical image of a world embedded in the civilisational 
framework lay at the heart of the ‘Primakov doctrine’ formulated 
in the 1990s, and of the ‘Putinism’ which has been implemented 
since the beginning of this century.
The question indicated in the title was until recently the sole prov-
ince of research by Western analysts of the Soviet Union’s psycho-
logical warfare as conducted during the Cold War. An excellent 
anthology of texts by these theorists and practitioners was com-
piled by the French writer and journalist Vladimir Volkoff1, who 
1 Vladimir Volkoff, Psychosocjotechnika, dezinformacja – oręż wojny [Psycho-so-
ciotechnology, disinformation – a weapon of war], Komorów 1999. His books 
published in Poland as Montaż [Montage] (2006) and Traktat o dezinformacji. 
Od Konia Trojańskiego do internetu [A treaty on disinformation. From the Tro-
jan horse to the internet] (1999), in which he summarised his many years of 
research in this area, also contained his work on misinformation.
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appended his own commentary accurately describing the goals, 
methods and means of the Soviet operations aimed at influencing 
the public opinion and policy of foreign countries. Russian publi-
cations on the subject are by their nature more or less disguised 
forms of myth-making, aimed at the self-definition of the Russian 
special services.
The renaissance in the study of Russian active measures which we 
are currently observing should be linked to their role in creating 
crises whose effects we can witness in Ukraine, Syria, Germany 
and the USA. This has led the member states of NATO and the EU 
to develop warning mechanisms to identify threats from Russia. 
One manifestation of this was the resolution adopted on 10 Oc-
tober 2016 by the European Parliament’s Commission of Foreign 
Affairs, and the report annexed to it entitled ‘On the EU’s strate-
gic communication aimed at countering hostile propaganda from 
third parties’2. This report shows that, by using various kinds of 
organisation (agencies, social media, foundations and associa-
tions, and by social groups, including political parties, which it 
has inspired), Russia is conducting a long-term process of desta-
bilisation intended to undermine the European system of values 
and Euro-Atlantic cooperation, to stoke conflicts between EU 
member states, and to justify the right of Russia to build up its 
own sphere of influence in Europe.
This topic also deserves special treatment because contemporary 
forms of ‘active measures’ are based to a considerable degree on 
Cold War-era schematics. The current problems connected with 
the Russian services’ aggressive actions are at the same time an en-
hanced version of the old problems, to which new information and 
communication technologies have contributed. A historical per-
spective may help to analyse and identify their covert mechanisms.
2 Be aware of Russian and ISIS propaganda, warn foreign affairs MEPs, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=2016
1010IPR46530&language=PL&format=pdf 
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The comments presented in this paper show the complexity and 
multi-dimensionality of the activities referred to as ‘active meas-
ures’. In the operations where they are used, it is sometimes diffi-
cult to define and determine their effect on the end result of these 
operations. There is a lack not only of research and tools to meas-
ure their effectiveness: in addition, the main limiting factor in the 
analytical process is the secret nature of the operations. This text 
consists of three parts. In the first, we attempt to define the con-
cept and examine those institutional structures within the KGB 
which conducted offensive informational and sabotage actions; 
the second part focuses on their conceptual basis and the organi-
sational innovations implemented after the Cold War; and in the 
third, we highlight the contemporary challenges and the ways of 
identifying them (by examining Russian doctrines, the foreign 
policy goals of the Russian Federation, and a list of the areas at 
greatest risk).
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THESES
•  The concept of ‘active measures’ covers offensive under-
takings aimed at disinformation, deception, sabotage, 
destabilisation and espionage, arising from the assump-
tions and priorities of the foreign policy of the Soviet Un-
ion, whose aim was to force its enemy to act in the manner 
desired by Moscow. The term combines various techniques 
used in operations aimed at influencing the international 
environment of the Soviet Union and supporting the for-
eign policy of the Kremlin.
•  The institutionalisation of active measures testified to 
an attempt to combine the various means of action into 
a single coordinated process, which was associated with 
plans for the broader ideological expansion of the USSR. 
The special services were the key element: they analysed 
the situation in the countries affected, prepared plans for 
operations, implemented these plans and chose the ‘sub-
contractors’. In addition to the organisational and execu-
tive features, the secret services also had security, con-
trol, and inspirational functions. The services used their 
channels to build up a network of agencies for influencing 
and financing actions supporting the Kremlin’s policy; 
they used intelligence positions in politically influential 
media, international organisations, etc. By creating false 
documents, activating the internal oppositions in the 
West and creating political and social crises there, as well 
as inspiring events desirable from the point of view of the 
Kremlin, the secret services worked under its supervi-
sion and control.
•  These activities also served the socio-technical self-defi-
nition of the USSR’s special services: in the Soviet state’s 
totalitarian strategy, the apparatus of repression in its 
ideological strategy became ‘the force of progress’, ‘the 
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Chekist army in the revolutionary war’, and ‘the winner 
in the war of intelligence services’. This mythologisation 
of the possibilities and unlimited potential of the special 
services conformed to the interests of the Kremlin, both 
by putting a kind of pressure on foreign public opinion, 
and by mobilising Soviet society and strengthening it in 
the belief in the effectiveness of the Communist Party’s 
policy. This was aided by the strict regime of state secrecy 
which surrounded the political police.
• Active measures were not discontinued after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the KGB. Attach-
ment to proven methods is a fundamental element of Rus-
sian political and strategic culture. The permanent bases 
of this culture include the legitimation of the regime by 
transferring internal tensions within Russian society to 
external enemies; mythologising its own power, the army 
and the special forces; the ‘fortress under siege’ syndrome; 
the primacy of psychological and ideological thinking 
over thinking in terms of political realism; and imposing 
an ideologised image of the world, and creating a confron-
tational approach to the international community.
•  A constant manifestation of this culture is the conduct 
of an ideological-psychological proxy war against the al-
leged enemy, which proxy-entities conduct by (non-mili-
tary) surrogate means. This is a permanent war, calculat-
ed over a long duration, and which requires the constant 
renewal of the concepts and mobilisation of its ‘soldiers’ 
on the various fronts, as well as the training of new gen-
erations of them.
•  Post-Cold War reality has expanded the opportunities for 
Russia’s special services. This translates into multi-level 
activities which cover a variety of areas: political, econom-
ic, military, social and informational. Their coherence 
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has been served by the new ideologisation of Russia. Ideo-
logical constructs are formatted in a geopolitical matrix 
emphasising the importance of the factors of space and of 
power. This is a spacious matrix which combines a vari-
ety of trends and geopolitical concepts: Eurasianism, the 
‘Russian world,’ conservatism, neo-Byzantism, Orthodox 
Chekism, neo-Stalinism and others.
•  These concepts are intended to provide a toolbox of tools 
– tools which legitimise the Putin regime, neutralise the 
Westernisation of the surrounding countries and prevent 
integration with the West, weaken the enemy’s position, 
etc. These are negative concepts, which are based on the 
image of the enemy. They exploit a potential which is de-
structive, not creative. Today, Russia is not imposing its 
own assumed values, but is in fact destroying the values 
of others. It does this by manipulating content which is al-
ready present in political discourse, and by choosing nar-
ratives that allow it to emphasise controversies and divi-
sions, i.e. to weaken the enemy.
•  The repertoire of modern ‘active measures’ differs little 
from that used during the Cold War. These techniques are 
implemented by means of both word (disinformation and 
propaganda) and deed (subversion, provocation, protest 
actions, paramilitary actions, etc.). The latest innovations 
mainly rely on the use of new means of communication, 
which have expanded the special services’ opportunities 
for action. The internet has abolished the old barriers to 
information and communication; it provides access to 
information in real time, making it easier for the special 
services to effect the rapid penetration of their targets. 
It has created possibilities for the rapid dissemination of 
specially-prepared content (its dissemination through-
out the world, its reduplication, the removal of objection-
able content, the imposition of their own interpretation), 
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while providing anonymity and access to the audience 
without any intermediaries. This means that today’s prob-
lems with Russia’s aggressive foreign policy are merely 
enhanced versions of the old ones.
•  Today, the Russian special services’ active measures are 
located in the context of the rivalry of civilisations, in 
which Russia, in defending its vital interests, is forced to 
resist the ‘aggressive’ West. The construction of internal 
cohesion by external conflicts, as well as the inclusion in 
the arsenal of support for the Russian Federation’s foreign 
policy of military forces and measures, demonstrates that 
these actions have been subordinated to the systemic, per-
manent, long-term offensive strategy of the state.
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I. ACTIvE mEASURES’: AN ATTEmpT 
TO ClARIfy THE CONCEpT
1. Characteristics of the concept and its terms
‘Active measures’ is a historical, now somewhat imprecise term. 
Like many Russian terms, this one also is a façade, behind which 
various methods of influencing the international community are 
concealed. These have been carried out by different actors, mostly 
at the inspiration and under the control of the special services. The 
term first appeared in the 1960s, on the wave of intensification of 
the USSR’s ideological battle against the West, as a collective term 
for various techniques (misinformation, special propaganda3, 
sabotage, etc.), which in common acceptance have negative con-
notations. In addition, the term conceals the offensive nature of 
such activities by presenting them as defensive.
Definitions of active measures can be found in publicly available 
KGB documents. In the ‘Dictionary of counterintelligence’4 issued 
by the KGB’s Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School in 1972, ‘active meas-
ures’ (Ru. aktyvnye meropriyatiya) are defined as “acts of counter-
intelligence making it possible to penetrate the intentions of the 
enemy, allowing his unwanted steps to be anticipated, to lead the 
3 In the scientific literature, misinformation and propaganda as separate con-
cepts have strictly assigned ranges of meaning. For more detail on this topic, 
see e.g. Tomasz Kacała, Dezinformacja i propaganda w kontekście zagrożeń dla 
bezpieczeństwa państwa [Disinformation and propaganda in the context of 
threats to state security], Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego [Review of Con-
stitutional Law] no. 2/2015. In this text, they are treated as techniques for 
influence, depending on the use of manipulated information; both of these 
techniques also combine ideological and informational sabotage. For this 
reason, the terms ‘disinformation’ and ‘propaganda’ are used interchange-
ably in this text.
4 Контрразведывательный словарь, Moscow 1972, pp. 161-2 (http://enc-dic.
com/search/?searchid=1913655&text=%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%D
0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%8F+%D0%B0%D0%BA
%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5). For a scan of the entire 
document, see https://docviewer.yandex.com/?url=ya-disk-public%3A%2F%
2FfAlGUq9IcULWRmqEoOAPcEXoJ1HxKPkixIzbR4mngdg%3D&arc.
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enemy into error, to take the initiative from him, to thwart his ac-
tions of sabotage. Active measures, in contrast to defensive meas-
ures, e.g. those concerning the maintenance of a regime of secrecy 
and the protection of state and military secrets, are offensive in 
nature, allowing the detection and prevention of hostile activities 
in their early stages, forcing the opponent to expose himself, im-
posing the will to act on him, forcing him to act in adverse con-
ditions and in ways desired by the counterintelligence services. 
In practice, active measures as practised in counterintelligence 
activities by the organs of state security include projects aimed at 
building up the position of spies in the camp of the enemy and its 
surroundings, conducting operational games with the enemy, dis-
information directed at him, compromise and demoralisation, the 
transfer onto the territory of the USSR of persons of special opera-
tional value, obtaining intelligence information, etc.”.
The intelligence services’ definition of active measures was giv-
en by the former KGB intelligence officer and archivist Vasili 
Mitrokhin, who drew particular attention to their political, eco-
nomic, military and ideological dimension. In Soviet intelligence 
these were defined as “espionage-operational activities, aimed at 
exerting influence on the foreign policy and domestic political 
situations of the countries that are the object of those activities, 
carried out in the interests of the Soviet Union and other social-
ist countries, global Communism and national liberation move-
ments; undermining the political, military, economic and ideo-
logical positions of capitalism; torpedoing its aggressive plans 
in order to create favourable conditions for the successful imple-
mentation of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union; and to ensure 
peace and social progress.”5
From these definitions, it follows that the concept of ‘active 
measures’ covers offensive undertakings aimed at disinfor- 
5 Vasili Mitrokhin, KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook, 
London 2002, p. 13.
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mation, deception, sabotage, destabilisation and espionage, 
arising from the assumptions and priorities of the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union, whose aim was to force its oppo-
nents to act in ways desired by Moscow. The term combines 
various techniques used in operations aimed at influencing 
the international environment of the Soviet Union and sup-
porting the policy of the Kremlin. The essence of active meas-
ures is treated identically in both definitions: influencing the 
enemy in order to create favourable conditions to successfully 
implement the objectives of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
A US State Department report from 1986 on anti-American mis-
information and propaganda campaigns6 defines it as “secret or 
decoy operations carried out in support of Soviet foreign policy. 
Active measures should be distinguished from both espionage 
and counterintelligence, as well as from traditional diplomatic 
and informational activities. The objective of such measures is to 
influence the opinions and perceptions of governments or public 
opinion in order to obtain a specific reaction.” According to the 
State Department, the essence of active measures was a game of 
appearances: disinformation and falsification, front organisa-
tions, and the manipulation of the media. These activities often 
include secret operations, although not always.
The range of terms covered by the concept of ‘active measures’ 
varies among different researchers into the KGB. Some include 
physical actions, such as sabotage or assassinations carried out 
abroad (such as those of Yevhen Konovalets in 1938, Lev Trotsky 
in 1940, Stepan Bandera in 1959, Hafizullah Amin in 1979, and 
many others), and perceive their continuation in the more recent 
murders of Aleksandr Litvinenko, Akhmad Maskhadov and oth-
ers. Nevertheless, the majority emphasise the use of applied tech-
niques: disinformation and fakes produced in order to discredit 
6 Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disin-
formation and Propaganda Campaigns, August 1986, Washington, p. 1.
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individual politicians, governments and organisations; the crea-
tion of front organisations, i.e. fictional organisations presented 
as non-government structures which are politically uninvolved; 
political provocations carried out by spies who conceal their con-
nections with the KGB, as well as by ‘useful idiots’, i.e. persons un-
aware of such connections. Similar mechanisms were also listed 
in a report by the FBI from 1987 entitled ‘Active measures in the 
USA in the years 1986-7’7, in which unwitting ‘agents’ (‘fakes’, as 
they were described), i.e. persons unaware of the influence being 
exerted on them, were distinguished from persons recruited by 
methods of espionage, who were aware that they were operating 
in the interests of the enemy, and thus causing harm to their own 
country.
Another key element of ‘active measures’, sabotage, most often 
used with the adjective ‘ideological’ (Ru. ideologicheskaya diversi-
ya), has both a wider and narrower range of meanings. It is often 
equated with ‘active measures’. In accordance with the general 
definition, it includes projects intended to destabilise the politi-
cal authorities and to lower the morale of society and the armed 
forces in a manner intended to bring about a crisis; and then, to 
changes in the domestic and foreign policy of the state concerned. 
Its indirect methods include inspiring, creating and directing the 
activities of both secret and public organisations within the given 
country, and diplomatic, informational, agitation-propaganda, 
psychological, blackmail and corruption actions. Direct forms of 
subversion, in turn, include acts of terrorism and sabotage carried 
out by KGB-trained militias (who are presented as spontaneous re-
sistance groups), assassinations (i.e. the liquidation of social and 
political activists), and also (in the case of anti-Communist revo-
lutions) armed interventions, such as Operation ‘Whirlwind’ in 
Hungary in 1956, ‘Danube’ in Prague in 1968, and the installation 
of Babrak Karmal and the intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.
7 For the Russian version of the document, see http://okpz.freeservers.com/
mashkov/activities/activities.html 
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This kind of activity has been subject to various spheres of state 
and social activity, such as religion, the dominant ideology, poli-
tics, economics, ethical systems, culture and science. Their scale 
has been demonstrated, among others, by the impressive list of 
organisations drawn up by the French researcher Thierry Wolton8 
which the Kremlin has considered as extensions of the KGB, in-
cluding groups such as the World Council of Peace (which in-
cludes 135 national organisations), the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (90), the Organisation of Solidarity of Peoples of Asia and 
Africa (91), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (210), the 
International Union of Students (118), the International Associa-
tion of Journalists (114), the International Democratic Federation 
of Women (129), the Christian Peace Federation (86), the Interna-
tional Association of Democratic Lawyers (64), the World Federa-
tion of Science (33), and others. These groups acted in the inter-
ests of Moscow and were financially supported by it. The World 
Council of Peace enjoyed Moscow’s special favour: as revealed in 
the 1990s, 90% of its funding came from the Soviet Union and the 
so-called socialist bloc.
Regardless of the offensive actions outlined above, extraordinary 
precautions were taken to avoid the West exerting any influence 
on the citizens of the Soviet Union. As a result, the rules of Mos-
cow’s game resembled a one-way street: Soviet propaganda and 
misinformation, for example, were presented as fully legitimate 
aspects of the free flow of information and interpersonal contacts, 
while the West’s attempts to oppose this informational sabotage 
were interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the So-
viet Union and as the illegal practices of ‘agents of imperialism’.
2. The institutional frameworks
The Soviet Union’s special services employed active measures from 
the time that state came into being: the Kremlin intended them 
8 Thierry Wolton, Le KGB en France, Paris 1986.
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to accelerate the victory of Communism over capitalism. They 
applied different structures, including civilian bodies, working 
closely under the direction of the ideological and international di-
visions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. The first so-called bureau of sabotage, misinforma-
tion and special propaganda (Ru. dezinfobiuro / dezbiuro) was set 
up in 1923 by Józef Unszlicht within the framework of the OGPU 
(successor to the CheKa)9. In the Ministry of Public Security, ex-
treme sabotage (terror) and soft ideological sabotage abroad were 
dealt with by the separate Bureau No. 1, whose head was Pavel Su-
doplatov (internal subversion on the territory of the Soviet Union 
was dealt with by Bureau No. 2 of the MPS).
The creation in January 1959 of another, separate structure, De-
partment D (the letter standing for deza, disinformation, in Rus-
sian operational jargon), as part of the 1st Main Directory (KGB in-
telligence), signified a new approach to this kind of work. It should 
be assumed that a similar structure was also created within mili-
tary intelligence (the GRU); as is apparent from the disclosed facts, 
the structures of the Main Political Directorate contained a 7th Di-
rectorate (for special propaganda) until 199110. Department D was 
created on the basis of the disbanded Information Committee at 
the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union, which employed officers 
from both civilian and military intelligence. The new structure 
was created at the initiative of Ivan Agayants, who was appointed 
its head. The Foreign Intelligence Service characterises him on its 
website as an outstanding intelligence employee who worked as 
a resident agent in France and Iran11.
9 More on this subject in Yevgeny Gorbunov, a historian of the Russian spe-
cial services; he sets this initiative in the context of the Soviet authorities’ 
acumen in glorifying the intelligence service as a factor of strategic sta-
bility. See Евгений Горбунов, Фактор-стабильности – стратегическая 
дезинформация, http://ricolor.org/history/rsv/good/2/
10 http://old.redstar.ru/2011/06/29_06/5_01.html
11 Before the war, Agayants specialised in sabotage, including the operation to 
bring the Spanish Communist Party activists Dolores Ibárruri and José Diaz 
to Moscow. During World War II he developed a spy ring against the Nazis 
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Department D initially had around 50 officers, who conducted 
disinformation campaigns both verbally and in active operations. 
The Department’s first task was to discredit the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany as ‘a country of neo-Nazism’. East German agents 
were sent to the Federal Republic of Germany to desecrate Jewish 
tombstones and paint anti-Semitic slogans on synagogues, stores 
and offices run by Jewish organisations, and to provoke the local 
population into taking similar actions. During the course of one 
year, as John Barron wrote12, the West German authorities report-
ed 833 anti-Semitic acts, a fact which was greeted with condem-
nation on the international stage and tarnished that country’s im-
age in the eyes of the public.
The success of the department meant that in 1963 it was trans-
formed into Service A of the 1st Directorate of the KGB (A standing 
for aktivka, i.e. active measures), and was entrusted with inspi-
rational and planning functions. Its heads, according to reports 
which have proved difficult to confirm, were: Ivan Agayants (1963-
1967), Sergei Kondrashev (1967-?), Nikolai Kosov (?-1975), Vladimir 
Ivanov (1975-90), and Leonid Makarov (1991). Its last leader was 
in charge of the residency in Oslo, and then became head of in-
telligence for the KGB of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Service A was the crowning achievement of his brilliant career, 
hence the conclusion that its leadership was reserved for the elite 
of the KGB13. The names of the heads of Service A appear in the So-
viet delegation at the arms reduction talks in Helsinki (1970), the 
negotiation of the final act of the CSCE (1974), and other events.
in Iran, researched the mechanisms of Fascist propaganda and conducted 
counter-propaganda actions. After the war he was again sent to the residency 
in Paris, was among other things co-founder of the Soviet-French Friend-
ship Society, and at the same time (from 1946) an employee of the above-
mentioned Information Committee and a lecturer at the 101st School (for KGB 
intelligence).
12 Quoted in Volkoff, Psychosocjotechnika…, op. cit., p. 130.
13 http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/A.htm
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Foreign trips to coordinate activities, however, were the preroga-
tive of the service’s leadership: according to Oleg Kalugin, the 
rank-and-file officers saw it as a position which offered little hope 
for promotion, which they identified with a posting abroad. Many 
of the officers lacked operational experience abroad, and in their 
assessment it was based on conspiracy theories about ‘the insidi-
ous machinations of the imperialists and Zionists controlled by 
the CIA’. Cell A in the KGB headquarters prepared guidelines and 
executive instructions for intelligence officers in its foreign resi-
dencies: in practice, operations of this kind were conducted by of-
ficers of the geographical departments of the 1st Directorate of the 
KGB. The residencies in Bonn and Washington were an exception, 
as they were reinforced by officers from Service A.
The institutionalisation of active measures demonstrated 
an attempt to link the various methods of influence into 
a single coordinated process, which was associated with 
plans for the broad ideological expansion of the USSR. On 
the one hand, this required the recruitment and running 
of agents of influence, secret financial operations, the 
build-up of bridgeheads of influence in opinion-forming 
media; and on the other, actions of sabotage and wreck-
ing, the provocation of conflicts, support for opposition 
groups and resistance movements, and paramilitary and 
military actions. When methods of ideological persuasion 
proved ineffective, arguments of ‘force’ were resorted to. 
These ventures were organised by the intelligence ser-
vices, which analysed the situation in the countries under 
attack, prepared operational plans, and nominated their 
contractors.
3. The special forces’ role in the proxy Cold War
The above-mentioned activities were reflected in reports and 
documents from the KGB. In a report which Yuri Andropov sent 
on 6 May 1968 to the Secretary-General of the Communist Party 
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Leonid Brezhnev14, we read for example that “within the frame-
work of operations in support of the USSR’s foreign policy, KGB 
intelligence carried out a series of actions intended to expose the 
aggressive plans of imperialist states, politically compromise the 
US administration and the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet 
State, and thwart acts of ideological sabotage being prepared in 
connection with the 50th anniversary of Soviet power” (sic). Also, 
in the Regulations for working with espionage agents and trusted 
colleagues15 (Ru. doverennoye litso, a trusted contact) of 4 July 1983, 
approved by the head of the KGB Victor Chebrikov, “active meas-
ures to combat the intelligence and sabotage activities of the ene-
my” are found at the start of the section of the document describing 
the tasks to be implemented with the help of the agency. Moreover, 
among these tasks we find “misinforming the enemy, combating 
the ideological subversion of anti-Soviet centres and foreign or-
ganisations, preventing anti-social and other undertakings, as 
well as negative processes among the exile community, which may 
arise under the influence of ideological sabotage by the enemy”. In 
the same document the category of ‘particularly valuable agents’ 
appears; these include “the staff of international organisations 
who have documentary information on the domestic and foreign 
policies of their government and their plans regarding the Soviet 
Union, government officials able to influence the course of their 
governments’ foreign policy, heads of military departments and 
general staffs, officers of the intelligence and counterintelligence 
authorities (especially cryptographers), scientists and experts, as 
well as leaders and authorities of foreign anti-Soviet organisations 
(exiles, Zionists, nationalists, clericals, etc.)”.
Until recently, the issue of ideological sabotage and disinforma-
tion-psychological operations was the sole focus of the research 
14 Report on the KGB’s activities in the year 1967; see http://www.famhist.ru/
famhist/andropov/000394f1.htm 
15 ‘Приказ...’ see the website of the Lithuanian blogger www.aurmonas.home.
mruni.eu/.../agenturinio-aparato-nuo. 
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carried out in the West. These were based on reports and me-
dia commentaries by famous deserters from the KGB (Yuri Bez-
menov, known in the US as Tomas David Schuman; Oleg Kalugin, 
Vasili Mitrokhin, Oleg Gordievsky, Anatoly Golitsyn and others), 
who revealed the operating techniques of Soviet intelligence and 
its strategic objectives. According to Gordievsky, for example, So-
viet intelligence focused on the following aspects:
1. the preparation of materials, including false documents, 
aimed above all at compromising US policy,
2. organising campaign groups to incite conflicts between allies 
in NATO and the EU, and
3. supporting pacifist movements and the potential for protest 
in the West.
In his book on the techniques of disinformation New lies for old, 
Golitsyn revealed the strategic objectives of this policy:
 – to push the US out of Europe,
 – to push the West out of Asia, Africa and South America, and
 – to conceal the Soviet Union’s own expansion, etc.
Active measures operations were of long duration. For example, 
the order by General William Westmoreland (commander-in-
chief of the American forces in Vietnam and Chief of General Staff 
of the USA), concerning the provocation of attacks by leftist ter-
rorist groups – and prepared in 1970 by Service A – was used for 
a whole decade; even in the 1980s, it served as an argument for the 
United States to support the Italian Red Brigades.
The facts confirming the participation of the special services in 
the Cold War were drawn mainly from KGB archive materials dis-
closed by deserters from those services; after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, these were supplemented by documents disclosed 
by the Baltic states16. A real goldmine of knowledge, straight from 
the original sources, came from the so-called Mitrokhin archive, 
16 See for example www.kgbdocuments.eu/ 
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which was made available in February 2014 by the Churchill Cen-
tre at Cambridge University. Some of the documents gathered 
therein are discussed in the books by Christopher Andrew and 
Vasili Mitrokhin, known under the titles of ‘The Mitrokhin Ar-
chive’ and ‘The Mitrokhin Archive II’. However, it is worth not-
ing that the authors themselves have pointed out that a significant 
part of the work contains manipulated information and fabricat-
ed evidence about the effectiveness of the KGB. Its head’s annual 
reports were intended to be a kind of certificate of propaganda 
success, not only for the KGB, but for the policy of the Soviet au-
thorities. Pandering to the Politburo also became a part of foreign 
intelligence activity: in 1977, resident agents devoted a great deal 
of effort to persuading local dignitaries to send the Soviet authori-
ties congratulatory letters on the occasion of the 60th anniversary 
of the October Revolution17.
After the dissolution of the KGB, this question was discussed in 
so-called ‘Chekist’ literature, i.e. memoirs by veterans of the in-
telligence and counterintelligence services. Many books with 
this background mythologised the services and their achieve-
ments. One striking example of this is the memoir by Vsevolod 
Radchenko, an officer of Department D, and later of the KGB’s Ser-
vice A18. In chapter 5 of his book Main profession – Intelligence agent, 
dedicated to active measures, he admits that “the great majority 
of them are still covered by the top-secret clause”; however, he 
stresses that a key aspect of this work was “operations to expose 
the anti-Soviet activities of Western intelligence services, in the 
first instance, the CIA and the British Intelligence Service”. The 
author cites three examples of counter-propaganda operations: 
discrediting the Western-published ‘Penkovsky Papers’, written 
by a deserter from the GRU who was arrested and sentenced to 
17 Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, published in Polish as Archiwum 
Mitrochina II. KGB i świat [The Mitrokhin Archive II. The KGB and the world], 
Poznań 2006, p. 52.
18 Всеволод Радченко, Главная профессия – разведка, http://litbook.net/
book/39527/glavnaya-professiya-razvedka/
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death in March 1962; the interventions by Service A connected 
with the publication in the West of My secret war, a book by Kim 
Philby, a British intelligence officer who escaped to Moscow in 
1963; and the organisation of the propaganda backdrop to the 
trial of Francis G. Powers, a pilot shot down over Sverdlovsk in 
the 1960s while flying an American U-2 spy plane on an espionage 
mission over the Soviet Union.
The confessions in Radchenko’s book, published in 2011, evoke 
reflections on the durability of Russian thought on the West as 
the main enemy, as well as of a specific social didactic: on the one 
hand, the author exposes how the Western intelligence services 
took advantage of the paid services of renegades, traitors, people 
with suspect reputations, and even schizophrenics, who compro-
mised themselves and did not represent anyone or anything (like 
Penkovsky); yet on the other hand, by motivating potential agents 
to cooperate with the Russian services, Radchenko emphasises 
the beneficial results of this collaboration for peace and stability 
in the world, and indicates its positive aspects (such as the life-
time care of the ‘great helper of the Land of the Soviets’, Kim Phil-
by). The author emphasises how helpful the special services were 
in supporting the policy of the Soviet government. Powers’s show 
trial in Moscow was, as the author notes, the idea of Roman Ru-
denko, the prosecutor-general of the USSR (the trial took place in 
the Hall of Columns of the House of Unions, close to the Kremlin, 
to which Powers’s family and a large number of Western journal-
ists were invited; by the way, they were also shown an exhibition 
of the plane’s remains which had been mounted in Gorky Park). 
The trial was intended to show the USA in a compromising light 
and discredit the American narrative (in the official communiqué, 
the White House was informed about the plane’s disappearance 
by NASA). Prosecutor Rudenko was the main player in a plan pre-
pared in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, 
and carried out under the personal supervision of Nikita Khrush-
chev: he accused the USA of a duplicitous policy and of violating 
international airspace law. The role of the special services, in this 
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case, undoubtedly came down to the selection of the Western jour-
nalists invited, the security during their stay, and the media am-
plification of the trial abroad. The finishing touch, and at the same 
time a certificate of the continuity of the Soviet services’ conspir-
atorial thinking about the West, is Radchenko’s interpretation of 
Powers’s death in a car accident: according to the author, this was 
the revenge of the CIA, which could not forgive its humiliation.
The subsidiarity of the special services relative to the Communist 
Party is demonstrated by an excellent analysis of archive materi-
als from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party 
and the KGB by the Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky. A detailed 
description of one of the combined operations to neutralise the 
potential effects of the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics, as 
well as their counterintelligence security, was summed up by the 
author in the significant statistics of the medals awarded for spe-
cial merits in the field. According to a resolution by the Politburo 
of 14 August 1980, during a ceremony at the Kremlin, awards were 
given to five thousand workers and officials, 300 military per-
sonnel, 1500 employees of the Interior Ministry – and 850 to the 
KGB19. The boycott of the Olympics was a reaction to the invasion 
by the Soviet army of Afghanistan in 1979; 63 countries refused to 
attend the games in Moscow. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine, 
however, said that “the idea of the boycott completely backfired 
(...) we have managed to fend off the anti-Soviet and anti-Olympic 
attacks and break the information blockade which has arisen 
around the Olympic Games.” A separate resolution by the Polit-
buro stated that “the vast majority of the participants and guests 
of the Olympics, who had come to the Soviet Union with a negative 
attitude to socialist reality, had the opportunity to see how deceit-
ful and untrue all the allegations of bourgeois propaganda made 
against us were”. On a side note, it should be noted that sport was 
19 Vladimir Bukovsky, Judgment in Moscow, published in Polish as Moskiewski 
proces, Warsaw 1998, p. 476. The author has made the archives scanned by 
himself available on his website http://bukovsky-archives.net/ 
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treated as an element of ideology and a tool of propaganda: sport-
ing victories were intended to demonstrate the superiority of the 
socialist system over that of capitalism. The legacy of the political 
treatment of sport and the propaganda matches of the national 
teams is the pathology of doping, which remains prevalent today.
The operations of influence during the Cold War evolved depend-
ing on the temperature of Moscow’s relations with the West. In 
times of tense relations, these were extremely aggressive and 
took on considerable dimensions: as examples, we might mention 
the response to Western criticism of the Soviet intervention in Af-
ghanistan in the 1980s, which involved dynamic and extremely 
prominent actions intended to discredit the United States; or the 
campaign associated with the supposed invention by the Ameri-
cans (in the course of research on bacteriological weapons) of HIV, 
ostensibly in order to eliminate African-Americans; or the trade 
in ‘spare-part children’, i.e. the kidnapping by Americans of chil-
dren from third-world countries and their murder in order to re-
trieve organs for transplants. During periods of ‘thaws’, the stress 
in the active operations was transferred to agitation/propaganda 
actions (the organisation of marches for peace and disarmament 
conferences; proposals for cooperation in the fight against the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism, the drugs trade and 
other problems that disturbed the West). The use of active meas-
ures was not halted after Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power and 
the announcement of his perestroika and ‘new thinking’, when 
the idea of cooperation between the KGB and the CIA was revived 
(Yuri Andropov had been the first to put forward such an initia-
tive), and talks were initiated on disarmament and the reduction 
of strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, as well as 
on exchanging information on nuclear weapons tests. These dis-
cussions were presented in propaganda as the result of “the So-
viet Union’s struggle over many years for a peaceful coexistence”, 
“cease-fires”, “the demilitarisation of space”, etc.; however, the 
‘peace’ protests organised by KGB lost the previous momentum 
which had, for example, been displayed by the protests against 
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American military involvement in the Vietnam war (1965-73) 
stigmatising American militarism (‘American death squads’) on 
the international stage. An important condition of this change 
was the progressive erosion of Communist ideology and the ex-
haustion of the planned economy model.
To sum up, it must be stated that the secret services were just one 
of the state’s many policy instruments, but nevertheless a key in-
strument. The employees of the intelligence service carried out 
the covert part of the exertion of influence. It suffices to mention 
the dual roles of individuals such as the KGB intelligence officer 
Vladimir Putin, who at the end of the existence of the Soviet Un-
ion was the director of the German-Soviet House of Friendship 
in Dresden: or the subsequent head of the Foreign Intelligence 
Service Yevgeny Primakov. According to common opinion, when 
Primakov was a full-time correspondent for Pravda, he was also 
the link between Soviet intelligence, the Kurdish militias and the 
Palestinian terrorists of al-Fatah in the Middle East. As a Profes-
sor at IMEMO (today the Primakov Institute of Global Economy 
and International Relations) and an expert of the party bigwigs, 
he was responsible for providing military and political support to 
dictatorships in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.
As a key part of the executive resources of the activities re-
ferred to as active measures, the special services carried out 
functions which were informative (analysis of the situation), 
organisational, security-related, monitoring, and also con-
ceptual and inspirational. They used their channels to build 
a network of agents who exerted influence and financed ac-
tions in support of the Kremlin’s policies. To implement these 
plans, agents were placed in positions in the opinion-making 
media, international organisations, etc. By generating false 
documents, by activating the internal opposition in the West 
and creating political and social crises there, as well as by 
causing events which were desirable from the point of view of 
the Kremlin, they worked under its supervision and control.
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These activities served the socio-technical self-definition 
of the USSR: the apparatus of repression in the totalitarian 
strategy of the Soviet state in its strategy of ideological war-
fare became ‘the force of progress’, ‘the Chekist army in the 
revolutionary war,’ and ‘the winner in the war of the intel-
ligence services’. The mythologisation of the special services’ 
possibilities and unlimited potential, as well as their suc-
cesses, accorded with the interests of the Kremlin as a kind 
of pressure it could put on foreign public opinion, and served 
as a way to mobilise Soviet society and strengthen its belief in 
the effectiveness of the policy of the Soviet Communist Party.
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II. CHANgES IN THE ApplICATION Of ‘ACTIvE 
mEASURES’ AfTER THE COlD WAR
1. Old methods in new realities
Activities employing active measures did not cease in the 1990s 
either, after the collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the KGB 
and the creation of a separate Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS: 
Rus. Sluzhba vneshney razvedki). This was confirmed by the intel-
ligence colonel Sergei Tretiakov, who went over to the Americans 
in 2002; according to his account, Service A was transformed into 
the MS unit (Ru. meropriyatiya sodeystviya, means for facilitation/
assistance); officially the FBS reported that the unit had been 
liquidated (which the Americans had requested anyway)20. As 
a sidenote it should be added that, according to Irina Borogan and 
Andrei Soldatov21, a parallel structure had been created in the FSB 
in 1999. It received the name of the Directorate for Support Pro-
grammes, and Aleksandr Zdanovich, the former head of the FSB’s 
Centre for Social Contacts, became its first head.
The continuity of both the institutional framework and the 
‘active’ methods is demonstrated by the use of arguments and 
propaganda slogans familiar from the 1990s: as during the Cold 
War, it is ceaselessly argued that Russia is democratising and re-
forming, and references are also made to the belief, popular in 
the West, in factional battles between ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’. Any 
attempts to criticise the government of the Russian Federation, 
for example the question of the brutal Chechen wars (which are 
described in the context of the fight against international terror-
ism), are interpreted as ‘unacceptable attempts to interfere in 
20 Pete Earley, Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America 
After the End of the Cold War (2008), published in Polish as Towarzysz J. Ta-
jemnice szefa rosyjskiej siatki szpiegowskiej w Stanach Zjednoczonych po zimnej 
wojnie, Poznań 2008, pp. 184-5.
21 Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, KGB/FSB. Władcy Rosji [KGB/FSB. The rulers 
of Russia], Warsaw 2015, p. 137.
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Russia’s internal affairs’ and a return to the practices of the Cold 
War. Right up to today, for example, the Russians argue that ‘cul-
tural transformations have led to a rise in cases of AIDS, which is 
an unfailing source of profits for American pharmaceutics’, and 
‘since the colour revolutions in the countries of the Maghreb, 
statistics have shown an unprecedented rise in income for the 
US from the arms trade’.22
The security services dedicated some of their activity to fight-
ing for their return to their former position as a pillar of govern-
ment, by building up Russian society’s need for a super-power 
state and a strong leader. They did so by applying tried and tested 
means, contrasting the weakness of the state and the chaos of the 
time with their own offer of strength and order. By exploiting the 
moods of a society which was suffering as a result of the process 
of privatisation, the years of transformation were presented as the 
years of the ‘Yeltsin-suffering’ (i.e. chaos, confusion), of ‘demokra-
tura’ (democracy+dictatorship) and ‘dermokratia’ (‘crapocracy’). At 
a symbolic level, this also found expression in the renewal of the 
Chekist ideology23. The beginning of this process was indicated by 
Boris Yeltsin’s establishment in 1995 of a national Day of the Secu-
rity Services’ Employees (this holiday fell on 20 December, the day 
of the CheKa’s creation; thus in the public space it immediately ac-
quired the name of ‘Chekist’s Day’). In this way Chekism became 
isolated from Communist ideology, the failure of which was indi-
cated, for example, by the removal of the statue of Feliks Dzher-
zhinsky in 1991. Its The renewal of Chekist ideology took place after 
only four years: the Chekists, who had previously stood in defence 
of Communism, and later participated in the transformation of 
22 See Константин Черемных, Маринэ Восканян, ред. А.Б. Кобякова, 
Анонимная война. «Новый 1968 год»: мировоззренческое содержание 
и механизмы революций 2.0 (доклад Изборскому клубу), http://www.
dynacon.ru/content/articles/1468/
23 For more on this topic see Julie Fedor, Russia and the cult of state security: 
The Chekist tradition from Lenin to Putin, Routledge 2011 (Russian publica-
tion 2012).
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Russia, became above all the guarantors of Russia’s geopolitical in-
terests and the state’s security in official rhetoric. The legislation 
adopted in 1995, particularly the law on operational-investigative 
activities, like the law on federal security organs, indicated a re-
turn to traditional priorities in Russia’s security policy, as did the 
transformation of the Federal Counterintelligence Service into the 
Federal Security Service in the same year24.
One effect of this activity by the Russian security services was the 
increase in the political importance of the siloviki, which was as-
sociated with their mass influx into politics, as well as their promo-
tion of Putin and the KGB people who remain at the helm of power 
in Russia to this day. This approach fell on fertile soil: regardless 
of how they were presented in propaganda – as ‘people with hot 
hearts, cold minds and clean hands’, ‘Orthodox Chekists’, or ‘a new 
nobility in the service of the interests of the state’ – in the view of 
the Russian public, the security officers are the embodiments of ‘or-
der’ and ‘the strength of the state’, even if this order is maintained 
by the use of violence and the methods of a police state.
The new realities, in the first place the removal of the corset of 
rigid Communist ideology25, as well as the rapid pace of social and 
24 It is worth emphasising at this point that the intelligence service of the for-
mer KGB relied on reorganisations. The First Directorate of the KGB initially 
adopted the name of the Central Intelligence Agency of the Soviet Union, and 
next that of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. Their 
leader (until 1996) was Yevgeny Primakov, later prime minister of Russia. 
After Vladimir Putin took power, the situation for the special services no-
tably improved: the President freely granted and still grants new powers to 
the services, and provides them with a level of secrecy unparalleled in other 
countries (state secrecy covers the services’ organisational structure, size 
and budget), as well as good financing and non-budget funding opportuni-
ties. The legal and organisational structures adopted in Russia in the 1990s 
ensure that the Russian system of special services is de facto deprived of any 
external supervision. It is hard to consider the President’s supervision of 
them as being of any importance, as he directs all the institutions of force in 
Russia and has control over them.
25 As Rafał Brzeski writes, “the Kremlin sponsors both left-wing and far-right 
groups, green environmental defenders of various kinds, sexual deviants, 
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economic transformations, have broadened the opportunities 
for the Russian security services, both within the country and 
abroad. Reporting directly to the President, the intelligence ser-
vice has since its very beginning operated in an aura of legalism 
and purposefulness, which was guaranteed in the law (prepared 
by the FIS) on the Russian Federation’s intelligence bodies adopted 
in August 1992. It stated that “full-time employees of the intelli-
gence service may occupy positions in ministries, departments, 
enterprises and organisations without disclosing their ties with 
the intelligence bodies.” Whereas during the KGB’s time intelli-
gence operatives had been embedded in foreign residencies under 
the guise of diplomatic placements and facilities recognised in the 
West (Aeroflot offices, sales representatives, offices of foreign cor-
respondents), from this moment on they were able to work abroad 
under any political, economic or social cover available. In addi-
tion, the 25 million-strong Russian diaspora scattered around the 
CIS and the world was used to build up these spying links.
The Russian special services were also encouraged by the new 
technological realities. The turbulent development of the internet 
abolished the previous barriers to information and communica-
tion. It provided access to information in real time, allowing the 
special services to effect instant digital penetration into the tar-
gets of their actions. At the same time, the development of the so-
called new media (traditional online media and social media) cre-
ated opportunities for the rapid dissemination of crafted content 
(its dissemination throughout the world, its easy duplication, the 
deletion of objectionable content, and the imposition of their own 
interpretation). The internet provides anonymity and access to 
the target audience without any intermediaries. It provided a new 
toolbox, which means that today’s problems with Russia’s aggres-
sive foreign policy are only an enhanced version of the old ones.
anti-globalisationists and all sorts of anti-system groups, and at the same 
time it introduces its trusted people into the world financial elite”; http://
niepoprawni.pl/blog/rafal-brzeski/agresywna-propaganda-kremla 
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This commitment to tried and tested methods, including the 
durability of active measures, derives from Russian politi-
cal and strategic culture. The fundamental elements of this 
culture include the legitimation of the regime by transfer-
ring internal tensions within Russian society to external 
enemies; mythologising its own forces, the army and the spe-
cial forces; the ‘fortress under siege’ syndrome; the primacy 
of psychological and ideological thinking over thinking in 
terms of political realism; and imposing an ideologised image 
of the world, and creating a confrontational approach to the 
international community.
A constant manifestation of this culture is the conduct of 
ideological-psychological proxy war against the alleged en-
emy, conducted by (non-military) surrogate measures by 
the proxy-entities. This is a permanent war, calculated to 
last a long time, which requires the constant renewal of the 
concepts and the mobilisation of its ‘soldiers’ on the various 
fronts, and for new generations of them to be trained.
2. The ‘Primakov doctrine’: a repackaged technology 
of geopolitical confrontation
After 1991, the role of the intelligence services in the creation of 
security and foreign policy clearly increased. This was largely 
thanks to Yevgeny Primakov. Back in the days of the KGB, as an 
experienced practitioner of active measures, he had already been 
a well-established figure in the intelligence services. He headed 
the list of candidates for members of the Politburo, and for many 
years he was a correspondent for Pravda; in the 1970s he was a rep-
resentative of the group of so-called academic analysts (he was 
deputy director of IMEMO and the Institute of Oriental Studies, 
which did research for the KGB and the Central Committee of the 
Soviet Communist Party); at the same time, he was vice-chairman 
of the Soviet Peace Committee, and finally an adviser to Mikhail 
Gorbachev on foreign policy, and conducted many diplomatic 
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missions at his initiative. When he became director of the intel-
ligence services, he had already acquired the image of a flexible 
bureaucrat, a supporter of cooperation with the West, and a self-
proclaimed democrat who had broken with Communism and its 
confrontational orientation.
From the 1980s, Primakov pushed a concept of geopolitical real-
ism, which later became known as the ‘Primakov doctrine’. For-
mulated as an intelligence doctrine, it became the primary con-
cept behind Russia’s foreign policy in the 1990s. The head of the 
FIS was the first to define the vital interests of Russia as follows: 
its territorial integrity; close integration within the CIS; main-
taining the state’s defence capabilities, including the option of the 
nuclear deterrent; guaranteeing the conditions for Russia’s inclu-
sion into the global trade system; maintaining the strategic bal-
ance in the world; and maintaining a buffer zone in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the borders of the Russian Federation. In his vision, 
Russia was still a superpower, and it needed a strong intelligence 
service and a revitalised army to maintain this status26.
At the core of this doctrine, on the one hand, lies the belief that 
the return of Russia as a superpower onto the arena global policy 
must be preceded by its modernisation, and on the other a realis-
tic assessment of the state of the nation, and of its economic and 
social potential; the planned economy model had been exhaust-
ed, and Russian society was dominated by a syndrome of ‘Soviet 
empire fatigue’. Because of this, Primakov mainly demonstrated 
pragmatism, convincing global public opinion that Russia had en-
tered the path of rational thought. His doctrine was also formed 
by Russia’s foreign and security policy during his time as minis-
ter of foreign affairs and prime minister (1996-9)27. In the second 
26 For more on this topic, see e.g. his memoirs: Евгений Примаков, Минное 
поле политики, Moscow 2007, pp. 103-28.
27 For example, in order to mobilise a broad anti-NATO front in both Russia 
and abroad, immediately after becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs he con-
vened a meeting with the ambassadors of Russia in the CIS countries, in-
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half of the 1990s, this politically calculated conception became 
entrenched, and acquired a clearly more anti-American tone. The 
Russian position was presented more assertively, insisting on 
the need for other countries to take the interests of Russia into 
account, as demonstrated by Moscow’s campaign of resistance to 
NATO enlargement, Russia’s attempts to realign Europe’s security 
architecture through its mutual guarantees with NATO to the 
states created after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as 
the reform of the OSCE; and not forgetting the ‘Primakov turna-
round – at the news of NATO’s intervention in former Yugoslavia, 
Primakov ordered the plane he was flying on to an official visit 
to the United States to turn back. Official policy was dominated 
by the ‘Eurasian’ strategy: Russia announced the construction of 
a strategic alliance between Moscow, Beijing and Delhi, plus pos-
sibly Tehran.
Primakov redefined the hierarchy of Russian intelligence’s objec-
tives and priorities. The main objective, the modernisation of Rus-
sia, defined the new intelligence priorities: scientific and techno-
logical intelligence (the so-called critical technologies) moved to 
the foreground, as did economic intelligence (due to the financial 
crisis, civilian intelligence also undertook an assessment of the 
options for arms sales, and considered the possibility of having 
loans granted by the Soviet Union returned to Russia; it also ex-
amined the economic outlook on the hydrocarbons market, and 
checked and verified what foreign contractors could offer, etc.). 
As Primakov wrote in his memoirs, the political intelligence ini-
tially focused on the ‘newly opened US and Western European 
residencies in the CIS countries’ as well as ‘extremist and nation-
alist organisations in the West which fomented separatist senti-
ments within Russia and the CIS’. In reality, this referred to the 
sabotage of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, which was 
structing them: “In our policy towards NATO we need the support of the CIS. 
The embassies are required to take care of this, and organise this support.” 
(Дипломатический Вестник, no. 9/1996).
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
6/
20
17
35
being devised at that time, and to the construction of a Russian se-
curity zone. Primakov saw another priority in strengthening the 
analytical component of the intelligence services. Analysts were 
given the task of shaping public opinion. At Primakov’s request, 
in 1992 Boris Yeltsin created another analytical institute called 
the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI), which, unlike 
the intelligence analysts, was able to present the position of the 
Russian Federation in public.
In its public activities the FIS emphasised legalism, de-politicisa-
tion (de-Communisation), de-KGB-isation and demonstrations of 
transparency. According to Primakov’s declaration, the special 
services acted within the limits of the law, in accordance with the 
law on the intelligence services adopted in 1992, not by using ‘un-
civilised’ methods such as the abduction of opponents or the use 
of psychotropic substances, or ‘dirty tricks’ against the Western 
democracies. It was stressed, however, that the de-ideologisation 
of the services did not mean they were departing from its deep 
traditions. This ostentatious transparency was served by the par-
tial opening of the archives and the public reports prepared by 
the FIS (the 1992 report was dedicated to the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, that of 1993 to the effects of potential NATO en-
largement, and that of 1994 to the vital interests of Russia in the 
CIS). These were intended to represent specific offers by Russia to 
Washington; they emphasised the need to negotiate these issues 
with Russia, and at the same time provided prepared scenarios for 
diplomatic moves and information actions (for example, the FIS 
highlighted the risks associated with the possession of nuclear 
weapons by countries which were politically unstable, or riven by 
ethnic and social conflicts; it provided arguments against NATO 
enlargement; and suggested that it represented a common front 
for the CIS countries, etc.).
The implementation of the short-term objectives of Russian for-
eign policy required subtle, less aggressive methods of influencing 
the West; however, this did not apply to the policy concerning the 
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so-called ‘near abroad’. For example, provocations and aggressive 
disinformation campaigns led the Georgian president Zviad Gam-
sakhurdia to flee Tbilisi in 1992 (he died under mysterious circum-
stances a year later). In 1993, the CIA officer Fred Woodruff, a secu-
rity adviser to President Eduard Shevardnadze, was shot. Because 
the assassination coincided with an official visit to Moscow by the 
head of the CIA, James Woolsey, this was interpreted in the West as 
a move to curb the Americans’ actions within the CIS. The Russian 
services continued to foment regional separatisms and conflicts. 
Their provocations began to make use of the Russian-speaking 
nationals of other member states, as was seen for example dur-
ing the escalation of the Russian-Latvian conflict in 1998, related 
to Latvia’s accession to NATO and the EU, as well as its new law on 
citizenship, which required citizens to undergo a Latvian language 
examination (Moscow demanded the zero option, i.e. the granting 
of citizenship to all Russian residents of the country). Latvia was 
accused of human rights violations, apartheid, racism and even 
fascism and ethnic cleansing. In order to internationalise the con-
flict, various ‘dirty’ methods were used: as recently as 1998 the 
graves of Soviet soldiers were desecrated, there were attacks on 
synagogues in Liepaja and Riga, and a bomb was planted in a rub-
bish bin in front of the Russian embassy in Riga. The Latvian au-
thorities deemed these incidents to be Russian provocations, and 
the Latvian special service asked the FBI to help them investigate; 
the press in Latvia and abroad placed the blame on the Russian FSB. 
In addition, protests by Russian-speaking citizens were held in the 
centre of Riga, and Latvia lost an estimated US$300 million due to 
the sanctions on food trade and fishing in the Baltic Sea imposed by 
Russia. Moscow also delayed the signing of agreements concerning 
the borders with Latvia and Estonia, as well as the ratification of 
a border agreement it had already signed with Lithuania, realising 
that this issue was a prerequisite for NATO membership. To sum 
up, they employed any means available.
Generally, due to the state of the nation and the reduction 
of foreign residencies, for the Russian secret services the 
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mid-1990s were mainly a period of activity within the CIS, 
and of domestic political and economic activity; in any case, 
this is where they were most clearly visible. The memory of 
the crisis in the KGB’s loyalty to the authorities, of which 
the coup in August 1991 was a clear symptom, was still fresh. 
Lacking funding and instructions from the Central Commit-
tee, the ‘Lumpenmilitariat’, as the institutions of force (gen-
erally armed formations and special services) were described 
at the time, went into business – in the first instance, the 
business of force, which resulted in the flourishing of private 
protection services related to the new companies, as well as 
supervising the process of privatisation taking place at the 
time. On the one hand this resulted in expanded opportuni-
ties for the Russian services to act abroad; and on the other, 
in their criminalisation.
3. The rule of Vladimir Putin: the return of the state 
and ideology
The geopolitical ‘Primakov doctrine’ became linked to the Puti-
nist concept of ‘raising Russia from its knees’. The beginning of 
Putin’s first term still passed under the banner of the moderni-
sation of Russia, but in official statements and public discus-
sions, new arguments appeared: ‘the West had betrayed Russia’, 
‘through NATO enlargement Russia has become the target of the 
United States and the Alliance’, the United States has ‘become 
a global policeman’, ‘NATO is an anti-Russian relic of the Cold 
War and the policy instrument of the United States in Europe’, 
‘the old Cold War divisions have not disappeared, but have merely 
been transformed’. In official rhetoric, Russia’s vital interests in 
the CIS appeared in the context of a Eurasian civilisational com-
munity which was separate from the West. The West became the 
antithesis of this community, as something which introduced 
global chaos and counteracted the assumed process of Eurasian 
integration. This rhetoric became especially radicalised after cer-
tain landmark events (such as the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine, 
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Putin’s speech in Munich 2007, the war with Georgia in 2008, 
the announcement of the creation of the Eurasian Economic Un-
ion, and others). This assertive rhetoric indicated an ideological 
U-turn by the Kremlin.
Putin, who established the centralised state and the special ser-
vices as a key element of his organisation, perceived at the same 
time the importance of the ideological ‘glueing together’ of the con-
struction of power that had ruptured as a result of (among other 
things) his own past activity, when as a typical representative of 
the frustrated middle generation of the KGB in the 1990s he dealt 
intensively with the privatisation process in St. Petersburg28. The 
new ideology takes today’s realities into account. Today, for exam-
ple, Russian analysts argue that all the modern digital and cyber-
technology that are products of the American military mainly 
serve to implement the geopolitical interests of the United States. 
US foreign policy is mainly being carried out by the use of ‘colour 
revolutions’ and ‘controlled chaos’, i.e. the covert direction of po-
litical, economic and civilisational processes. As it predominates 
in the global information space, the United States is imposing its 
own understanding of the economy and state constitutions upon 
the world, destroying any values and ideals that deviate from the 
idea of the consumer society. They are proving that the global geo-
political game is a contest about the reach of influences, and only 
Russia has the potential to check the US.
After Vladimir Putin came to power, the methods referred to as 
‘active measures’ had their systemic nature restored to them. They 
were included in the paradigm of the new generation of wars, cul-
tural and civilisational wars, including ‘the West’s information 
war against Russia’, which gave them a military aspect, while 
at the same time emphasising the role of the forces and special 
28 Prof. Włodzimierz Marciniak discusses this topic in his afterword to the 
Polish edition of the book by Yuri Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky, The 
Age of Assassins, published in Polish as Korporacja zabójców, Warsaw 2008.
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services. This new paradigm located Russia in the role of ‘defend-
er’ of its own citizens and of those states which ‘did not consent to 
the hegemony of the United States or to a unipolar world’, that is, 
a defensive role, not that of an aggressor which initiated conflicts 
(‘Russia does not threaten, Russia is threatened by the expansion 
of the West and NATO’). The propaganda of its own values, its al-
leged spiritual and cultural advantage, is presented as ‘Russian 
soft power’ (“Like all the states in the world, Russia has the right 
to the use of soft power in international relations”)29. The practice 
of ‘soft power’, however, inclines to its use as a technology for so-
cial and political control, the management of knowledge and per-
ception of the world; in fact, it camouflages the use of deceitful 
actions30. What is more, Russia’s defence of its interests and the 
propaganda of its own values inevitably weakens the position of 
other countries and the disintegration of their societies, i.e. the 
destruction of foreign values.
The ideological void of the 1990s was quickly filled by new doctrines, 
political myths and ideologies. From the beginning these were for-
matted in a geopolitical matrix, imposing the view of a multi-polar 
world and emphasising the importance of the factors of space and 
29 The task of building Russian soft power, according to Yevgeny Kosachov, the 
former head of the state agency Rossotrudnichestvo, has become particularly 
topical “since the return of Crimea to the motherland”: “we are not as lonely 
and isolated as our opponents endeavour to portray us. And we are certainly 
not defenceless against foreign soft power. We must continue, consistently 
and systematically, to unite those links of support for Russia abroad – scat-
tered, partially elemental, partly still unknown to us – into real points of 
support – just as the Western countries do, unconcerned with the costs.” 
(www.rs.gov.ru; this post appeared on 20 June 2014).
30 For more on this topic see Michał Wojnowski, Zarządzanie refleksyjne jako 
paradygmat operacji rosyjskich operacji informacyjno-psychologicznych w XXI w. 
[Reflective Management as the operating paradigm of Russian information 
and psychological operations in the 21st century], Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego [Review of Internal Security], no. 12/2015; ibid. Koncepcja 
„wojny nowej generacji w ujęciu strategów Sztabu Generalnego Sił Zbrojnych 
FR’ [The concept of ‘a new generation of war’ as understood by the strate-
gists of the General Staff of the RF’s Armed Forces], Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego [Review of Internal Security], no. 13/2015.
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power. As they interpret the global space, Russian political scien-
tists focus on the need to re-organise it, thus justifying the Krem-
lin’s foreign policy moves. And because the geopolitical worldview 
legitimises the government in Russia, the Kremlin stimulates its 
intellectual resources to search for a national idea which will hold 
the superpower state together. However, even today this has still 
not been developed, something which is undoubtedly made diffi-
cult by Russian realities, above all the ethnic and religious plural-
ism of Russian society. The geopolitical matrix has so far proved to 
be remarkably spacious, combining a variety of trends, concepts 
and technologies, such as the above-mentioned political concepts 
of geopolitical realism, Eurasianism, neo-Byzantism, isolationism, 
Occidentalism, neo-Slavophilia, ‘the Russian world,’ conservatism, 
Orthodox Chekism, neo-Stalinism, the limited sovereignty of Rus-
sia’s immediate neighbours, and others. At the same time this is 
a neo-imperialist matrix, linking ideological constructs from the 
days of both the Soviet and the pre-Soviet empires. As a result, Rus-
sia does not have a single universalist ideology, although Russian 
conceptualists stress that the modern Russian ideology consti-
tutes an offer for a world which does not consent to the hegemony 
of the United States. Many ideological constructs, their symbols 
and propaganda slogans have been drawn from the well of history 
and adapted to today’s realities: however, for the most part they are 
turned towards the past, in which they differ strongly from Com-
munist ideology, which faced a bright future.
According to Michał Wojnowski, “enormous influence on shaping 
the main lines of Russian geopolitical thought has above all been 
wielded by the attitude towards four great traditions of the Rus-
sian Empire, which are the impetus behind many [of the current] 
constitutional solutions, and also serve as important points of ref-
erence in the search for a new identity intended to replace Soviet 
nostalgia.”31 In this context, the author lists the heritage of Kievan 
31 Michał Wojnowski, „Neobizantyzm”: polityczna utopia czy nowa ideologia elit 
Federacji Rosyjskiej w XXI wieku? [Neo-Byzantism: a political utopia or the new 
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Rus, the legacy of the Byzantine Empire (which was a key concept 
both in Russia and in the Grand Duchy of Moscow), the reign of 
the Mongols and the reign of Peter I.
Russia’s historical heritage has been reinterpreted in the light of 
these new concepts, which has at the same time made possible the 
most important reinterpretation of the relationship between the 
state and the church: the Orthodox Church has now become an 
ally of the State. Whereas in Soviet times, clergy of Communist 
ideological convictions were recruited and infiltrated as a hostile 
environment, at present the state and the religious authorities 
are a joint element of the Byzantine heritage. The special services 
are also included as an instrument of this power, as evidenced by 
the ideological construct of ‘Orthodox Chekism’. The significant 
renewal of this symbolism (the shield and sword have become 
‘the sword of truth and the shield of faith’) testifies to the skilful 
semiotic use of symbols which was one of the techniques of ma-
nipulation, like that of ‘Chekism’; the Eastern Orthodox Church 
has now been given the role of legitimising, or even sacralising, 
the government in Russia. The conceptual convergence of the So-
viet and pre-Soviet empires also has another value. It justifies the 
thesis that the new empire has, as it used to, the potential to de-
velop – that is, the potential to reorganise the geopolitical space 
of the whole world. By imposing its own vision of the world, the 
new Russian ideology not only describes it; according to tradition 
it represents an instruction to act, to change the world.
One of the more recognisable of these systemic projects is the 
‘Russian world’ (russkiy mir). At its roots lies the geopolitical con-
cept of a separate civilisation. It refers to the Imperial concept of 
Byzantism, and of Moscow as the third Rome, as well as the con-
cept of Eurasianism developed in the 1920s. The idea of a spiritual 
ideology of the elite of the Russian Federation in the 21st century?], Przegląd 
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego [Review of Internal Security], special edition. 
Warsaw 2013, p. 154.
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Eastern Slavonic community was one of the ideological pillars of 
the Russian Empire and served the sacralisation of the empire 
and its power. The ‘Rus’ian’ spiritual (Orthodox) community was 
transformed into a state-political (Russian) community. By taking 
over Rus’ as its own historical heritage, thanks to the pseudosci-
entific concept of the ‘triune Rus’ian nation’ (Belarusian-Ukrain-
ian-Russian), Russia has come to inhibit the national and political 
emancipation of Belarus and Ukraine.
In recent years, to meet the needs of the broader-scale influence 
operations, the interpretations of the terms ‘Russian world’ and 
‘compatriots’ have been extended. The ‘Russian world’, as we read 
on the website www.russkiymir.ru, “refers to our compatriots in 
the countries of the nearer and farther abroad, emigrants from 
Russia, their descendants, foreign nationals speaking Russian, 
students and teachers of the Russian language, and all those who 
are sincerely interested in Russia”. In this definition, a ‘country-
man’ comes to mean any person who identifies with the ‘Russian 
world’, regardless of their nationality and citizenship. If such 
a person asks for help from Rossotrudnichestvo or the Foundation 
for Support and Defence of the Rights of Compatriots Abroad, then 
they can count on getting it. It must be assumed that this is not 
a unilateral path: in this way, the diaspora becomes an ally of the 
intelligence service, acting as an important ‘shelter’ for it.
Russia has justified its interventions in Georgia, Crimea and the 
Donbas in terms of defending the ‘Russian world’ and ‘the largest 
divided nation in the world’; it threatens the countries of the post-
Soviet area with the potential to foment separatism in those re-
gions in which Russian-speaking citizens are settled in a compact 
way, and so on. Military force has become one tool for ‘protecting 
Russians abroad’, a concept which was included in the Military 
Doctrine of 2010. The myth of the ‘Russian world’ has become an 
ideological platform for the reintegration of the territories of the 
post-Soviet area. More: the artificial creation of a civilisational 
community with Russia at its centre has also become the offer of 
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‘a global community of values’ which deviates from the consum-
er-society values of the ‘American world’, Pax Americana.
Historical myths have always played a huge role in the Russian 
vision of building its own position on the international stage. The 
myth of the ‘invincible Red Army’ has contributed to the con-
struction of a ‘community of winners’, Russia and the CIS. Every 
day sees the use of aggressive campaigns ‘demystifying the falsi-
fication of Russian history’. Wide-ranging information campaigns 
are carefully prepared and run, at Putin’s decree, such as the cele-
brations of the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution. These 
have a clear message: as Sergei Naryshkin, the head of the Foreign 
Intelligence Service, said during a meeting of the Russian Histori-
cal Society on 29 December 2016: “Russian historical memory is 
the target of destructive actions by foreign state structures and 
international organisations pursuing their geopolitical interests 
as part of their anti-Russian policy.”32 Historical film-clips often 
appear in President Putin’s political messages, as he constructs 
the political identity of modern Russia (for example, ‘the black 
ingratitude at liberation by the Red Army’, ‘the managerial ef-
fectiveness of Stalin’, or most recently ‘a Russia without borders’). 
One significant U-turn by Putin should be noted in this context: 
whereas at the beginning of his presidency he spoke of the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastro-
phe of the 20th century’, at a meeting of the National Assembly in 
2013, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation, he spoke about the two ‘national disas-
ters’ of Russia in the 20th century (in 1917 and 1991), which had led 
to the breakdown of statehood and “the rupture of the cultural 
and spiritual code of the nation”.
32 The organisers predict that the campaign will be founded on the organi-
sational and executive bases devised during the celebrations of the 100th 
anniversary of World War I, http://rushistory.org/proekty/100-letie-
revolyutsii-1917-goda/s-e-naryshkin-yubilej-revolyutsii-1917-goda-neob-
khodim-dlya-isvlecheniya-urokov.html 
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The systematic approach to this problem is evidenced by its con-
stant presence in the work of the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation. During a meeting dedicated to this question in Octo-
ber 2016, the Council’s experts once again listed the facts which 
are most often ‘falsified’ abroad:
1. the nationalities policy of the Russian Empire;
2. the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union;
3. the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism;
4. the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact;
5. the Soviet Union’s response to the crises in the GDR, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and other Eastern-bloc countries (which are 
interpreted in a contemporary light, as anti-Communist po-
groms and colour revolutions organised by emissaries of the 
United States33); and
6. the revolution of 1917.
As we should assume on the basis of the documentaries already 
shown by Russian state TV on the latter subject, the celebration 
of the 100-year anniversary of the revolution will focus around 
the civil war of the time (juxtaposing ‘patriotic’ and ‘unpatriotic’ 
attitudes), as well as the armed intervention by the West. These 
programmes are clearly linked to Soviet propaganda: victory in 
the civil war confirmed the superiority of the Communist ideolo-
gy and established an inspiring cultural pattern. This pattern was 
renewed during the Second World War, which is known in Russia 
as the Great Patriotic War. In our time, the symbols of fascism and 
the Russian fight against it were used to discredit the Baltic States 
on the eve of their accession to NATO and the EU; latterly, the fight 
against ‘Ukrainian fascism’ has been used to justify Russia’s ac-
tions in Ukraine.
These myths, repeatedly employed in television debates and as 
memes on social networks, have many uses. The constant use 
33 TV Rossiya, 29 October 2016; http://kommersant.ru/doc/3131019 
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of the image of the enemy and the cult of victory serve the po-
litical consolidation and militarisation of society, as they blur 
the boundaries between war and peace. The enemy, as identified 
in the geopolitical sense, has both a potential for confrontation 
which is hard to evaluate, and serves to legitimise the actions of 
the Russian government. The image of the enemy, of conspiracy, of 
intervention, of psychological warfare with Russia, has helped to 
overcome the crisis of the legitimacy of the Russian government 
in the 1990s. And today it is being constantly renewed, in order to 
extend this legitimacy.
Today the image of Russia in the world is associated above all 
with the ‘stolen empire’ and the country’s failed modernisation. 
The Kremlin explains the failure of its policy by the ‘aggression’ 
and ‘errors’ of the West, blaming it for its own failures. The propa-
ganda image of the state has thus been replaced by the image of 
its leader: strong and firm, the one who has raised Russia from its 
knees and who effectively defends its interests, who has set about 
‘the gathering of the Russian lands’, who is the architect of ‘a new 
community of victors’, etc. This image of the President is continu-
ally perpetuated by analysts and the Russian media abroad. For 
example, the head of the Defence Research Centre of the Russian 
Institute of Strategic Research (RISI), Igor Nikolaychuk34, has 
belittled the importance of factors such as the attractiveness of 
the country and the strength of its attraction: in his opinion, the 
image of the country is today being replaced by the image of the 
state’s power. The problem is not only that the Russian model of 
development is unattractive, and thus its ability to win allies by 
‘soft’ political methods is negligible. Russian ‘controlled democra-
cy’ does not have the social safety valve of free elections: the same 
candidate is continually re-elected. This choice must then be justi-
fied by false ideological reasons. When the ideological factor fails, 
the factor of force is then demonstrated: in fact, this is the only 
tangible sign of real Russian power. In this sense, the ‘victorious 
34 http://riss.ru/smi/6696
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little war’ in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea and the war in 
Syria have clearly demonstrated Russia’s desire to strengthen ac-
tive measures through the use of military operations.
Russian political myths, which have risen to the rank of a new 
ideology, are formatted in a geopolitical matrix, which em-
phasises the importance of the factor of space and the factor 
of power. This kind of concept is intended to provide a toolbox 
(of tools legitimising the Putin regime, neutralising the West-
ernisation of the surrounding countries and preventing inte-
gration with the West, weakening the enemy’s position, etc.). 
These are negative concepts, which are based on the image of 
the enemy. They exploit a destructive potential, not a crea-
tive potential. Today, Russia is not imposing its own assumed 
values, but is rather destroying the values of others. It does so 
by manipulating content which is already present in political 
discourse, and choosing narratives that allow it to emphasise 
controversies and divisions, i.e. weakening the enemy. It has 
little to do with Western soft power: it should primarily be 
thought of as a technology of the geopolitical confrontation 
between Russia and the West.
4. The old fundaments of organisation and innovation
From the beginning, the systemic project of the ‘Russian world’, 
which was originally addressed to the West as a flagship pro-
gramme of Russia’s ‘soft power’, was functional in nature. When 
extended to cover the post-Soviet states, in order to keep them 
within Russia’s political and cultural orbit, it allows us to perceive 
several trends in how current operations supporting the Krem-
lin’s foreign policy are implemented.
First, they represent the expression of the systemic, inte-
grated activity of the state. The Kremlin uses all the tools avail-
able to it. The project is being carried out by many actors, both 
governmental (in this particular case, the Russkiy Mir foundation 
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established in 2007, and the Rossotrudnichestvo agency founded 
a year later35), and the so-called non-governmental organisations 
(such as the Gorchakov Foundation, which aims to develop Rus-
sian public diplomacy), business (such as the Gazprom and Lu-
koil companies, or private oligarchs like Konstantin Malofeyev, 
who are instructed to implement individual programmes (such 
as grants and scholarships) or to finance them. Other important 
participants in the project include the Orthodox Church, the Rus-
sian army and the media. In brief, the system has subjected many 
actors to itself, all of whom are pursuing a common objective.
During the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, 
which was accompanied by a top-down psychological-ideological 
action entitled ‘Russian Spring’, a series of actors supporting the 
‘Russian world’ were activated. The military and paramilitary 
activities were joined by Russian nationalists, controlled extrem-
ist organisations, Cossacks, as well as ordinary criminals such as 
the FSB reservist Igor Girkin, a.k.a. ‘Strelkov’, the former ‘defence 
minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic’, who took responsibil-
ity for the military operation of the separatists of the so-called 
Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (as he put it, he “pulled 
the lever of war, by liquidating the Right Sector sabotage groups”); 
or Aleksandr Matyushin, the leader of the voluntary Varyag 
35 The modus operandi of the Rossotrudnichestvo agency and the Russkiy Mir 
foundation, which is headed by the political scientist, historian and politi-
cal technologist Vyacheslav Nikonov (a grandson of Vyacheslav Molotov), is 
a clear and overt element of support for Russian policy. These organisations 
are oriented to work in the long term. Every year they organise a ‘Summit of 
the Russian World’; annual international conferences of teachers and profes-
sors of the Russian language; and also (in cooperation with diplomatic delega-
tions) conferences, seminars and presentations in centres of Russian culture 
and science, as well as celebrations of anniversaries and concerts. In 2014, 
their activities focused on patriotic education, historical memory, IT training 
and initiating appeals for support for Russia after the annexation of Crimea; 
in 2015, celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and 
the fight against Russophobia predominated. In 2016, the resolutions of the 
compatriots’ summits emphasised the need to counteract the falsification of 
history, attempts to diminish the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union in 
the victory over Nazism, and the profanation of monuments to war victims.
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battalion in the Donbas, whose origins lie in the illegal ‘Russian 
Style’ extremist organisation and BORN (the Armed Organisa-
tion of Russian Nationalists). Fraudulent organisations such as 
the Rightist-Conservative Union, the Great Homeland party of 
Nikolai Starikov, the Novorossiya movement, the Battle for the 
Donbass movement, the Eurasian Youth Union, etc., have organ-
ised support for Ukrainian separatists, while at the same time 
concealing the participation of Russian soldiers in the armed ac-
tions which to this day are being presented as a ‘Ukrainian civil 
war’. Several movements under the Anti-Maidan banner have 
arisen, including those run by the nationalists Starikov and Alek-
sandr Zaldostanov (a.k.a. the ‘Surgeon’), the leader of the biker 
club called the Night Wolves. This organisational boom contin-
ues today, as evidenced by the new International Foundation for 
a Donbass without Weapons, at the head of which stood Nikolai 
Leshchenko, a pro-Russian politician from the Ukrainian Party of 
Regions, who now lives in Moscow.
Secondly, the special services are present at all levels of this 
kind of project: conceptual, organisational and develop-
mental. Officially, in the institutional sense, the ‘Russian world’ 
project was (and still is) being worked on by the Russian Insti-
tute of Strategic Research (RISI) and the Institute of CIS States, 
also known as the Institute of Diaspora and integration. Until 
2008 the RISI was the official think-tank of Russia’s intelligence 
service; at present it operates within the structures of the Presi-
dential Administration. For many years it was headed by the in-
telligence analyst Leonid Reshetnikov; it is currently run by the 
former head of the FIS Mikhail Fradkov.
Both these centres represent what is known as ‘information ana-
lytics’, inspired by the Russian special services, which gave birth 
to the need for a convergence between conceptual and executive 
action, and also to expand the executive resources. Sometimes 
it takes on a conspicuously public form, as in the case of the for-
mer GRU analysts who initiated a project entitled ‘Academy for 
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Development Management. The Institute of Heaven-Politics (Ru. 
Institut Nebopolitiki). Its co-author Andrei Kozyrev (not to be con-
fused with the first head of the Russian foreign ministry) has list-
ed the ‘mental unblocking’ of citizens, i.e. unlocking their ability 
to distinguish truth from lies, the national core from foreign ac-
cretions, etc. and the analytic build-up of confidence in the au-
thorities (to achieve a situation in which the citizens do not reject 
the authorities’ initiatives) among the functions of such analysis. 
Kozyrev has also devised the concept of ‘analytical security’; in 
his thinking, the analytical security parameters of Russia in-
clude: analytical self-sufficiency, support for the nation’s geopo-
litical project (analysis in terms of project and world-outlook), 
analytical warfare (analytical misinformation), analytic defence 
(the identification and prevention of analytical sabotage), and the 
reproducibility and development of analytical resources (assets).
The longest-running entity in this segment of policy support is the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, established by a decree of Boris Yelt-
sin in 1995, which was co-created by a group of former analysts 
from the special services and the Defence Ministry. At its inspira-
tion, a project entitled ‘The Academy of Informational Self-Defence’ 
was created in 2008. It issues a quarterly periodical entitled Infor-
matsionnyje Voyny (Information Wars)36, which is simultaneously 
an educational project, a platform for popularising discussions on 
Russia’s security, and an intellectual base for educating a new gen-
eration of analysts. Its authors describe Western achievements in 
military science, and also draw upon Soviet theories from the Cold 
War. At the heart of their interest lies the perfection of techniques 
of psychological influence. The authors include an increasing 
number of students and doctoral candidates. This kind of training, 
for a new generation of psychological warfare with the West, is an 
36 www.iwars.su; more see Jolanta Darczewska, Russia’s armed forces on the 
information war front. Strategic documents, Centre for Eastern Studies, 
OSW Studies, 27 June 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
studies/2016-06-27/russias-armed-forces-information-war-front-strategic-
documents
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extension of the state’s training programmes: in accordance with 
the guidelines from the Security Council of the Russian Federa-
tion37, the subjects of ‘geopolitics’, ‘information war’ and ‘disinfor-
mation and propaganda’ have now taken permanent places in the 
military and civilian educational curricula.
Third, ‘active measures’ are still being implemented through 
front organisations, which today imitate the so-called third 
sector, i.e. non-governmental organisations. In the West, non-
governmental organisations are formed at private initiative and 
work in the interests of society. Russian so-called NGOs, as rep-
resented by various clubs, associations and foundations, work in 
the interest of the state and are created by the state. The Russkiy 
Mir Foundation was set up at the decree of the President, as was 
the Gorchakov Foundation and the Fatherland’s History Founda-
tion. These are state NGOs, or so-called GONGOs (government-
organised non-governmental organisations). These have a public-
private financial background, thanks to which they can afford to 
undertake an extensive range of operations. The Russian asso-
ciations are most often organisations of the nomenklatura, which 
have significant institutional potential.
The GONGO sector is constantly being expanded. Many older or-
ganisations have been reactivated, such as the Russian Historical 
Society, currently headed by the current chief of the intelligence 
service, Sergei Naryshkin; the Russian Geographical Society, 
chaired by the minister of defence, General Sergei Shoigu; and 
the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society under General Sergei 
Stepashin, who held a variety of prominent positions in the secu-
rity sector, including as head of the Federal Counterintelligence 
Service, the predecessor of the FSB. (This group includes the So-
ciety for the Development of Christianity in the East, which for 
example organises humanitarian aid for Syria, rebuilds churches 
destroyed by the so-called Islamic State, etc.).
37 http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/information/ 
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Examples of representatives of Russia’s so-called third sector 
are numerous to say the least; their names include the Strategic 
Culture Foundation, the Association of Orthodox Experts, the 
Katehon Club, the Izborski Club, also known under the name of 
the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism, the ‘Public Diplomacy’ 
Foundation to Support Civil Initiatives, the CIS-EMO Interna-
tional Monitoring Organisation, and many others, including 
those created abroad, such as the Institute of Democracy in 
Washington or the Institute for Dialogue of Civilisations in Ber-
lin. They serve the Russian and foreign media as opinion leaders. 
They also arrange agitation-propaganda events (such as confer-
ences, marches, protest actions, concerts). On the one hand, they 
are ideological platforms in the fight with the West and ‘Atlanti-
cism’, and on the other, they serve to build up networks of con-
tacts in the West.
Fourth, the Russian media abroad do not only work to cre-
ate a favourable media framework for Russian policy or to 
disseminate misinformation: they also build up the bridge-
heads of Russian influence on the West, and organise and ex-
pand the circle of ‘understanders of Russia.’ As part of Russia’s 
global mission, the media broadcasting Russia’s message to the 
rest of the world have been transformed: the end of 2013 saw the 
establishment of the Russia Today International Agency (Rossi-
ya Segodnya), which merged the TV station RT (Russia Today), 
the radio station Golos Rossii and the RIA Novosti press agency. 
In November 2014, the director-general of this state company, 
Dmitry Kiselyov, unveiled another multimedia project, Sputnik, 
which integrates and coordinates from Moscow the work of the 
foreign radio stations which had previously operated under the 
brand name of Golos Rossii. This message, broadcast in 30 lan-
guages, is multiplied exponentially by internet portals, the news 
agency, analogue and digital broadcasting and mobile applica-
tions. On the model of RT, the radio propaganda message is tai-
lored to local conditions; they increasingly use the services of lo-
cal journalists and opinion leaders. The task of the new company 
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was explained by Igor Nikolaychuk, the analyst for RISI quoted 
above38: it is to achieve the maximum extension of the viewing 
and listening audience, as well as to get local leaders and author-
ities involved in co-operation, as “Russophiles are everywhere, 
you only need to organise them.”
Fifth, the new media and the so-called non-governmental 
sector, like the think tanks, are being used to cross-link 
the Russian message. Networking technologies are understood 
widely and involve both real and virtual informational spaces. 
Russian network structures are organised from the top, and di-
rected, controlled and adjusted from the top, which ensures the 
hermetic nature of the system. They are strictly centralised, and 
act in accordance with the principles of ‘network collectivism’, 
within the framework of a common ideological matrix, in accord-
ance with the instructions of the executive. For this reason, the 
decentralisation of activities and the horizontality of networks in 
the West present a serious research problem for Russian experts: 
the nature of the Russian system only permits a principle of strict 
hierarchy and action in accordance with its own cultural code, in 
its confrontation with the ‘foreign’ cultural code. The Russian net-
works co-create the above-mentioned foundations, associations, 
controlled social movements and youth organisations. These rep-
resent so-called nodes in the network.
In contrast to the role of paid bloggers and trolls in spreading 
misinformation in the comments sections of the websites of tra-
ditional media and on social networks (the ‘troll factories’ were 
detected thanks to the trolls themselves; that is, the human factor 
was involved), it is difficult to detect the link between them and 
their control centres. Building this kind of network is one area of 
the work of the abovementioned informational analytics. As ex-
plained by the FSB Colonel Yuri Kurnosov, the originator of the 
38 http://riss.ru/smi/6696
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‘Russian School of Analysis’ project39, it is based on “the imple-
mentation of new technologies of collective analytical work (...), 
which is intended to guarantee the following: Russia’s takeover 
of the historical perspective of the transition to a new geopoliti-
cal situation; the management of hierarchized social systems, in-
cluding the management of the mechanisms of their self-organi-
sation, as well as the implementation of special projects”.
The Russian networks make good use of modern communication 
technologies, which have also created new opportunities in moni-
toring the situation in target countries, as well as in broadening 
the channels of deceptive impact on the audience.
Sixthly, the operations’ military component has been 
strengthened. This is linked to the important role of the factor of 
force in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Over the centuries this was 
invariably regarded as a marker of Russia’s position as a global 
power, an instrument of deterrence, for imposing political pres-
sure and building spheres of influence. Today it has become an 
argument justifying Russia’s raison d’état as a superpower. This 
is due in part to the limitations of the ideological factor, which 
is perceived abroad as artificial and inappropriate to Russia’s un-
attractive development model. The factor of force is, in fact, the 
only tangible manifestation of Russia’s great-power status. In this 
sense, the ‘victorious little war’ in Georgia in 2008, the annexa-
tion of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, as well as the Russian 
action in Syria, clearly testify to the desire to support the use of 
active measures by military means.
Seventh, the modern use of active measures is characterised 
by their regionalisation. This allows the regional and cultural 
specificities of the target area to be taken into account, and helps 
39 Kurnosov presented the founding of this project in his books Аналитика как 
интеллектуальное оружие, Moscow 2012; Алгебра аналитики. Секреты 
мастерства в аналитической работе, Moscow 2015 and others.
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to reduce the mental and cultural distance between the aggressor 
and the target of his actions. The effectiveness of the operation of 
influence depends on analyses of the balance of power and the po-
litical situation, but also of the political culture and the status of 
popular demands. These analyses form the basis of the social engi-
neering techniques used by the Russian special services to set the 
elites and the public of the target country against each other. Such 
research is supported by the Kremlin: it is no coincidence that in 
2011 the Kaliningrad Polish Research Centre received a presiden-
tial grant for the study of Polish elites40. Research in this direction 
is being carried out by Russian think tanks.
Eighth, in the activities of the Russian special services we ob-
serve a departure from the principle of the total camouflage 
of their participation in the implementation of the projects. 
This applies above all to the wide range of their activities in 
the open information space. Leaving traces of, or even suggest-
ing Russian inspiration, confirms the ubiquity of the Russian spe-
cial services in the mind of the target audience. By considering 
these actions as an important tool in the arsenal of active meas-
ures, in particular with regard to their role in influencing the out-
side world through offensive mechanisms of misinformation and 
‘maskirovka’ (distractions from the attacker’s real activities and 
their purposes), it is difficult to call them ‘secret’ methods which 
would be difficult or impossible to identify.
40 http://www.ruvek.ru/?module=articlesp&action=view&id=5856
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III. THE RUSSIAN ‘ACTIvE’ THREAT: 
TODAy’S CHAllENgES
1. The role of the special services and their support 
operations in the Russian doctrine
The new conception of the role of the so-called ‘force sector’ and 
its support activities was crystallised during work on the Doc-
trine of Information Security of the Russian Federation and the 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation from the year 2000. 
These works were based on geopolitical philosophical and cultur-
al grounds. Both in these doctrines and the later Russian strate-
gic documents which were based on this approach41, these ideas 
found expression primarily in redefining the concept of threats to 
Russia. These are defined as attempts to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the Russian Federation, to seize its assets, to bring about 
its weakening, destabilisation, the disintegration of its territory, 
its cultural degradation, and to limit its sovereignty. Whereas in 
the 1990s the exploitation of Russia’s raw material resources was 
emphasised, currently the civilisational and spiritual threat is 
in the foreground: the marginalisation of national culture by the 
American substitute for culture, demolishing the institutions of 
the family, faith, and the spiritual essence of the ‘Russian man’ 
(russkiy chelovek). Russian strategists argue that in fighting glo-
balisation, Russia is also fighting with anarchism in the world, i.e. 
the negation of all kinds of hierarchy, whereas it defends the sov-
ereignty of the state and of international law, examples of which 
are supposed to be its positions regarding Kosovo or Syria.
41 For more see Jolanta Darczewska, The devil is in the details. Information 
warfare in the light of Russia’s military doctrine, Centre for Eastern Stud-
ies 19 May 2015, OSW Point of View, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
point-view/2015-05-19/devil-details-information-warfare-light-russias-
military-doctrine; and Russia’s armed forces on the information war front, 
op. cit. 
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In successive editions of the publications mentioned above, the 
evaluation of the current global situation has been radicalised. This 
is confirmed by the latest edition of the Doctrine of Information 
Security from December 2016. As assessed in section 12: (...) “the 
range of application of the measures of information and psychologi-
cal influence is constantly expanding, leading to the destabilisation 
of the political and social situation in different regions of the world, 
and violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states”; 
“discrimination against Russian mass media is increasing”, “in the 
Western media the amount of materials containing tendentious 
opinions of the state policy of the Russian Federation is increasing; 
the impact of the information society in Russia, primarily on young 
people, is intensifying”. ‘Civilisational’ security is a strategic objec-
tive in the field of defence (the defence department has the job of 
“neutralising the psychological-informational impact on society, in 
the first place on the young; and of preserving historical, spiritual 
and patriotic traditions” (item 21). The security sector has the same 
task, and in addition it has to take care to “raise the effectiveness of 
the State’s information security policies” (item 23).
In recent years, the doctrinal approach to the special services’ 
role has been coordinated. In the new editions of the Military 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation (from December 2014) and 
the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federa-
tion (from December 2016), emphasis is laid on the importance 
of ‘new, non-traditional methods of connecting military and 
non-military measures in the four-dimensional combat space’. 
Laying the emphasis on the information space and so-called 
non-military measures demonstrates the sanctioning in official 
doctrine of the position of the so-called civilian special services 
as entities existing in the logic of the complex of military op-
erations, and which often play a key role in these operations42. 
42 In this document we encounter a description of potential activities whose 
implementation would the special services to participate. These include: “the 
comprehensive use of the armed forces, as well as political, economic, in-
formational and other non-military measures, implemented by a broad use 
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In the text of the Military Doctrine, adjustments have been 
made to the list of potential internal threats, the elimination of 
which is directly related to the implementation of the legal com-
petences of the institutions of force43. The catalogue of external 
threats highlights areas which had hitherto not been associated 
with military threat. These are: sabotage by foreign special ser-
vices; and the impact of information on the population, includ-
ing young people, in order to undermine the historical, spiritual 
and patriotic traditions of the defence of the homeland, or pro-
voking social tensions.
While analysing Russia’s doctrinal documents and taking their 
role as propaganda into account, and fitting them into the scheme 
of deterring the enemy, it is worth noting that the changes incor-
porated into them testify to the thinking of the Russian power 
elite. By highlighting their role in maintaining the stability cre-
ated by the authoritarian political system, they present this sta-
bility as an objective which guarantees that Russia will retain 
its strong position in the world. The permanent adoption of the 
idea that the West is violating the vital interests of Russia puts 
the special services not only in the role of key defenders of those 
interests, but also of the defenders of society, which among other 
things justifies the services’ activity aimed at isolating society 
from external influences.
of the potential of protest and of special operations forces; influencing the 
enemy throughout his territory, in the global information space, in airspace, 
land and sea; participation in the activities of irregular military formation 
and private armed companies; the use of indirect and asymmetric opera-
tional methods; the use of political forces and social movements funded and 
managed from outside”.
43 The list of internal risks includes: activity aimed at the overthrow by force 
of the constitutional regime of the Russian Federation, the destabilisation 
of the domestic political and social situation in the country, the disruption 
of the operation of the organs of state power, important state and military 
properties and of information infrastructure; the activities of terrorist or-
ganisations and individuals aimed at violating the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Russian Federation.
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A variety of different terms are used in the strategy papers in-
stead of the expression ‘active measures’. The most distinctive 
was the term ‘special means of influence’. This appeared in the 
2000 Military Doctrine; in subsequent editions it was replaced by 
various concepts, both general and specific, such as ‘non-military 
means’, ‘indirect action, such as wrecking, sabotage, organising 
irregular armed formations’, ‘informational operations’, ‘infor-
mational-psychological operations’ or ‘informational-technical 
operations’. In the most recent version of the Military Doctrine 
from December 2014, the term ‘information technology’ appeared, 
without any more detailed elaboration. It has also been included 
in the new edition of the Doctrine of Information Security, where 
it occurs in a variety of contexts: as a ‘shield’, with the aim of de-
fending the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the pres-
ervation of the cultural, historical and spiritual-ethical values of 
the multi-ethnic nation of the Russian Federation (section 8), and 
also as the ‘sword’, the West’s information weapon used for politi-
cal and military ends to intervene in the internal affairs of other 
states (paragraphs 15 and 16). This concept represents another 
example of Russia adapting Western terms for its own ideologi-
cal and cultural system of concepts, the distinctiveness of which 
has been emphasised by many theoreticians. It also falls within 
the broader concept of ‘political technology’, which has gained 
immense popularity in Russian political science. In a nutshell, 
this means a complex of covert and overt methods and activities, 
mainly social engineering and psychological methods of manipu-
lating human behaviour (although some political scientists do not 
rule out methods of direct coercion and physical violence), which 
serve the achievement of specific political objectives.
The laws of the special services’ jurisdiction also include word-
ing which refers to the planning, organisation and conduct of 
long-term operations whose aim is to actively support diplomatic, 
political, military and economic actions. This is demonstrated by 
extracts of the law on the foreign intelligence service of the Rus-
sian Federation from 1996 (and the reference to them in the law on 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
6/
20
17
59
the Federal Security Service introduced in 2003), which specify 
the tasks of the intelligence institutions. The tasks of the FIS, GRU 
and FSB include:
 – providing support in the implementation of undertakings by 
the state in the interest of ensuring the security of the Russian 
Federation (article 2, paragraph 2);
 – ensuring an environment conducive to the successful imple-
mentation of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field 
of security (article 5, paragraph 2);
 – supporting the economic development, scientific and techni-
cal progress of the country and the military-technical assur-
ance of the security of the Russian Federation (article 5, para-
graph 3)44.
References to the term ‘active measures’ today appear mainly in the 
work of the special services’ historians, as well as in operational 
jargon as ‘aktivka’, ‘activists’ etc. For example, in a report for Rossi-
ya-24 TV from 12 October 2016, the war correspondent Yevgeny 
Poddubny stated: “The bombing of a convoy of humanitarian and 
civilian targets in Aleppo is the responsibility of the anti-Assadist 
Jabhad an-Nusra [group], which is backed by the United States and 
its NATO allies, and avails itself of the potential of terrorists.” He 
illustrated his thesis with footage showing how children make 
themselves up with the use of ash and red paint, and “are shown in 
the West as victims of Russian war crimes”. According to the cor-
respondent, “the terrorists were instructed by Western activists” 
(i.e. specialists in active measures). It must be assumed that in the 
propaganda-disinformation activities, this slang term has become 
a kind of cultural code understood by its organisers and actors45.
44 Federal law on the foreign intelligence service of 10 January 1996: http://
www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/8732 
45 For example, see the material entitled Активисты в США и Обаму обвинили 
Сороса на перевороте в Украине [Activists in the United States blamed 
Obama and Soros for the upheaval in Ukraine], http://tvzvezda.ru/news/
vstrane_i_mire/content/201702240643-w01a.htm 
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2. The special services’ place in the armed forces: 
the Russian situation
The doctrinal inclusion of the special services into the military 
security system has confirmed their position in the so-called sec-
tor of force. Since the beginning of 2013, the armed forces of the 
Russian Federation, which continuously train in rotation around 
successive regions of Russia, have been in a state of permanent 
combat readiness. The armed forces’ activity has been accompa-
nied by the involvement of the institutions of force, which sup-
port the actions of different types of troops. Moreover, the range 
of exercises related to the mobilisation of the civil administration 
and the verification of its ability to function during wartime has 
been increased. For obvious reasons, intelligence activity has also 
increased. Russia’s opening of new fronts of conflict and rivalry, 
from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, leaves open the question of 
whether the Foreign Intelligence Services are able to maintain 
sufficient capacity to carry out a wide range of ‘active projects’. 
The involvement of the Federal Security Service revealed in this 
area (e.g. in the Baltic States and the USA) demonstrates that this 
service, due to the enormity of the tasks before the Russian spe-
cial services, has become the de facto intelligence-counterintelli-
gence service. A separate issue is the development of the potential 
of military intelligence, whose activities in cyberspace are no 
longer associated only with the field of military security, as evi-
denced by the GRU’s recent actions in the context of the presiden-
tial elections in the United States46.
The problems outlined above confirm that the Russian special ser-
vice system is incompatible with the existing service systems in 
the West. This is determined by the following factors:
46 Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact-
sheet-actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity-and 
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 – the lack of a strict delimitation of competences, which means 
that the conventional classification of services (intelligence, 
counterintelligence and protecting the legal order) does not 
come into consideration: the Russian services have a wide 
range of powers, each of which is a multi-functional tool of the 
Kremlin’s policy;
 – a level of internalisation unparalleled in other countries: 
strict secrecy covers the organisational structure, the size 
and budget of the special services (their expenses are not only 
covered under the item of ‘Security and protection of the legal 
order’, but much of it is hidden in other sections of the budget, 
such as culture or higher education). The services can also be 
funded from outside the state budget;
 – the functions they carry out: in addition to functions typical 
of special services (information, security, control, preventive, 
repressive), the Russian services additionally serve an integra-
tional function (the security apparatus is a factor which links 
the administrative apparatus of the state), as well as a ‘moder-
ating’ function (the generation and creation of phenomena and 
facts desirable from the point of view of Russia’s authorities).
This has consequences for both the security sector and the cur-
rent regime in Russia. The integrative function puts the sector’s 
institutions in an autonomous position with regard to the other 
executive state bodies, and in a superior position with regard to 
the apparatus of the state administration (at regional and terri-
torial levels). One consequence of this is that the organs of civil 
authority can take over the operational methods of the special 
services (the areas covered by state secrecy are expanded, discre-
tionary authority expands). Upon orders from the Kremlin, the 
special services are becoming embroiled in political tasks and the 
ongoing political struggle. Moreover, informal relationships and 
non-transparent decision-making processes have become dis-
tinctive features of Putin’s regime.
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The informal legal order ensures the continuity of the special 
services’ informal institutional commitments at the meeting 
point of politics, namely the businesses controlled by people 
from the state security sector and organised crime. This busi-
ness enjoys the support of the state and the privilege of secrecy. 
This leads to the fossilisation of the defects in Russia’s political 
and economic system, including corruption and abuse of power, 
which prevents the effective enforcement of the law in a way 
that is equal for all citizens. It is also a factor in the maintenance 
of criminalisation in the security sector. For this reason, the 
high position of the special services in the hierarchy of the po-
litical system should not be equated with their effectiveness or 
their declared mission of building the state as stressed in official 
rhetoric. The lack of effective control or supervision over them 
increases their temptation to commit abuses and illegal activi-
ties, as is confirmed by the corruption scandals in which they 
are involved, as well as the high level of illegal violence with as-
sassinations alone. The system of the Russian special services is 
conflictual by its very nature, but actual conflicts are effectively 
muted. If these scandals were publicised and consistently dealt 
with, this would risk a compromise of the image of the Russian 
state and its security institutions.
All this means that describing the role of the special services in 
an integrated, broad complex of activities supporting government 
policy is not an easy task. Furthermore this topic covers offen-
sive intelligence and counterintelligence activities which are not 
available for open sources, i.e. covert offensive operations, often 
of complicated and long-term operational combinations, subject 
to the implementation of an established political goal. They take 
into account the participation of special services officers operat-
ing outside Russia’s borders, the use of espionage resources, the 
carrying out of inspirational activities often ‘under a foreign flag’, 
organising channels for financing initiatives in support of the for-
eign policy of Russia, and in extreme cases, the use of violence. 
A separate issue is the use of cyber technology to weaken critical 
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infrastructure in foreign countries. This type of activity, although 
it should be classified as a support project, has the features of pin-
point attacks as part of military action scenarios. On the other 
hand, activities in cyberspace associated with the theft of sensi-
tive data are used for political purposes, for example to discredit 
a politician from a foreign country, which for example may result 
in the destabilisation of the domestic political scene.
For analysts working with open sources of information, another 
major challenge is the preliminary identification of areas at risk 
of ‘active projects’ by the Russian special services. Any analytical 
reflection on this topic requires:
 –  the contextualisation of events observed in the strategic and 
tactical objectives of the foreign policy of Russia;
 – the identification (through aims and results) of areas of par-
ticular operational interest to the Russian special services, as 
well as of institutions and social groups which are potentially 
susceptible to influence from Russia;
 – the continuous monitoring and analysis of political develop-
ments and economic and social processes in selected areas, 
a critical approach to the assessment of the causes of events 
observed, as well as the evaluation of conclusions supporting 
the thesis of the involvement of the Russian special services;
 – careful interpretation of camouflaging and masking activities 
which hinder the correct identification of risks, including as 
a result of the construction by Russian special services of the 
image of a ‘false agent’, an expression of which is demonstra-
tive transparency, drawing simple conclusions by highlight-
ing the pro-Russian nature of certain people or organisations 
(the overt activity of the ‘pro-Russian lobby’, promoting con-
spiracy theories, importing particular importance to events of 
marginal significance);
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 – a broader interpretation of the cultural context of the special 
services’ activities. Political culture – and its descendant, stra-
tegic culture – make it possible to interpret facts which are 
difficult to explain on the basis of political pragmatism. In 
such cases, it may prove helpful to draw upon the historical 
experiences of the Russian special services, including in the 
field of ongoing support projects.
3. Areas affected by Russian actions
By recognising Russia’s declared foreign policy goals as a starting 
point, which can be helpful in identifying areas which are par-
ticularly vulnerable to the active projects of the Russian special 
services, the primary task is to identify the policy’s strategic of-
fensive targets in Europe47. These are:
 –  the maintenance and possible expansion of the sphere of in-
fluence, by finding effective methods of influencing the politi-
cal elites of European states to take actions in accordance with 
the interests of Russia;
 –  in the regional dimension: keeping control over Belarus, re-
gaining control over Ukraine, and striving to destabilise the 
Baltic states, as part of weakening the eastern flank of NATO;
 –  the disintegration of the European Union by stoking disputes 
between the member states and limiting the influence of the 
47 This description of the aims of Russian foreign policy was 
based on publications by Marek Menkiszak from 2013 to 2017: 
Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better?, https://trans-
atlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Pages-from-The_Eastern_
Question-4.pdf ; Russia’s best enemy. Russian policy towards the United States 
in Putin’s era, Centre for Eastern Studies, OSW Point of View, 15 February 2017, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2017-02-15/russias-best-
enemy-russian-policy-towards-united-states-putins-era; and Greater Europe. 
Putin’s vision of the European (dis)integration, Centre for Eastern Studies, 
OSW Studies, 14 October 2013 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
studies/2013-10-14/greater-europe-putins-vision-european-dis-integration
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United States in Europe, including by interfering with cooper-
ation within NATO, and as a result, the revision of the current 
shape of European security (including limiting the efficiency 
of the defence policy in Central Europe);
 –  the deconstruction (by setting the partners against each oth-
er) of plans to build separate political, military and economic 
alliances that may make it harder for the achievement of the 
aims of Russian policy;
 – stoking anti-American sentiment among the authorities, elites 
and societies of Europe, and the consistent building of a pro-
Russian lobby, whose aim is to perpetuate in society the notion 
of having to accept Russia’s ‘reasonable requests’, which in turn 
is intended to weaken any determination to oppose such actions.
Today, the support operations carried out by Russia’s services are 
focused on creating crises in other countries. These cover a wide 
range of overt and covert activities carried out on the territories 
of foreign states, the strategic objective of which is the continual 
undermining of the public’s trust in their authorities, the destabi-
lisation of the situation on part of or all of the territory of a foreign 
state, as well as discrediting its authorities on the international 
stage. This activity is intended to reduce society’s desire to resist 
political, economic and military pressure from Russia. These of-
fensive political measures being carried out by the Russian spe-
cial services are treated as a ‘surrogate war’, and these projects 
are systematic and long-term in nature.
They are being conducted in most European countries. Russia 
uses political parties, non-governmental and church structures, 
among others, and the way they are used depends on the current 
climate in political and economic relations with the country con-
cerned, as well as internal political, social and cultural circum-
stances. Different measures are applied to Germany, where there 
is a significant potential for destabilisation associated with the 
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large Russian-speaking diaspora; and in France, where Russia 
acts through a strong pro-Russian environment. One important 
weapon in the special services’ arsenal is the creation of mecha-
nisms for corruption (for example, with the aim of covertly con-
veying financial assets from Russia via European banks), or the 
open hiring of former Western politicians in companies which 
pursue Russian economic objectives.
Analysis of Russian support operations allows us to distinguish 
the following universal areas of action:
 – influence on information space (creating web portals which 
camouflage their pro-Russian nature while lending credibility 
to Russia’s position, reaching out to major media outlets, cre-
ating the desired image of Russia as an important global and 
regional player, as dissemination mechanisms of an uncritical 
approach to information from Russian sources);
 – the use of the psychological military factor, of demon-
strations of force to suggest that Russia might take mili-
tary action (military manoeuvres near the boundaries of 
NATO countries, which could for example include scenarios 
for unblocking the Kaliningrad oblast, demonstrating Russia’s 
military advantage over NATO forces in the region, and thus 
lowering public morale in other countries, the dissemination 
of information about the use of tactical nuclear weapons, in-
telligence activity aimed at assessing the capacity of counter-
intelligence services and attempting to disrupt them, with 
particular regard to infiltrating the institutions responsible 
for defence preparations and military structures, disavowing 
actions being undertaken to improve the state of defence);
 – supporting groups favourable to Russia (a wide spectrum 
of activities aimed at popularising Russian arguments justify-
ing the policy of Moscow, instilling the belief that opposition 
to Russia is doomed to failure, stoking negative ideas through 
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the media and instrumentalising internal disputes in order to 
discredit the ‘pro-American’ or ‘anti-EU’ policies of the coun-
tries’ governments, highlighting the adverse economic im-
pact of limiting trade with Russia, building up a false image of 
‘pragmatic Russia as a friend of the West’), promoting Russia 
as a state where conservative ideology can form the basis for 
an agreement with conservative circles in the West;
 – penetrating and supporting groups critical of closer in-
tegration within the EU or cooperation with the US and 
NATO, or which represent extreme nationalist views, and 
strengthening their arguments;
 – the long-term construction of social, political and intel-
lectual groups which are friendly to Russia or which un-
wittingly support the implementation of Russian politi-
cal objectives (local authorities, business circles, educational 
cooperation, youth exchange programmes, artistic groups, 
sports fans’ associations);
 – the instrumentalisation of criminal groups (smuggling, 
arms trading) and using them to infiltrate society;
 – special pinpoint operations aimed at raising the level of 
threat of internal destabilisation (such as cyber-attacks 
aimed at demonstrating poor preparation for the protection of 
information sensitive for NATO; acts of sabotage aimed at cre-
ating panic among the local population; disruption to critical 
infrastructure, the ability to create a migration crisis, the de-
struction of symbols related to Russia and accusations of stok-
ing Russophobic sentiments, organising demonstrations in 
support of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, com-
promising representatives of the political elite by fabricating 
compromising materials in order to exacerbate internal politi-
cal conflict, especially during parliamentary or presidential 
elections in a given country).
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
6/
20
17
68
Russian activities are also carried out outside the territory of the 
‘target state’. Symptoms of these are attempts to influence the 
public opinion and governments of other countries, and their aim 
is to discredit their foreign policies and make it more difficult to 
implement international initiatives contrary to Russian aims. 
These include:
 – monitoring activities and building an unfavourable at-
titude towards individual countries in EU institutions. 
These methods include exploiting the political and economic 
relations of Russia with other EU countries, based on mutual 
interests. In this context, the Russian special services involve 
themselves in Russian business contacts;
 – conducting media operations of varying levels of inten-
sity in the West, aimed at maintaining the negative image 
of any country that asserts itself towards Russia as being 
unstable and leading an irresponsible foreign policy, and 
threatening to European security. These methods are imple-
mented using local media and journalists who have been in-
spired by Russia;
 – preventing initiatives aimed at intensifying coopera-
tion with countries in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States 
and Central and Eastern Europe. One of these tools is the 
constant stoking of ethnic conflicts, especially in Belarus, 
Ukraine and the Baltic states.
One prominent feature of these activities is support (organisa-
tional, financial, and information and propaganda) for radical, 
populist, anti-American, Eurosceptic and separatist political par-
ties and movements in Europe. Russian political parties and social 
organisations controlled and instructed by the special services 
work to consolidate such groups. One spectacular example of this 
was the conference organised in Moscow in September 2016 un-
der the auspices of the Russian Anti-Globalist Movement, with 
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the participation of twelve foreign separatist organisations (from 
Italy, the US states of Texas and California, Moldova, Lebanon, 
Somalia and others). It was held under the banner of ‘A dialogue 
of nations’, and was funded by the Charity Foundation created 
by President Putin. The organisation of seemingly neutral politi-
cal conferences, which are dedicated for example to a dialogue of 
cultures or the cooperation of professional groups, should be as-
sumed to be just an initial step in calling out people and groups 
who (consciously or unconsciously) can be used in the operational 
machinations of the Russian special services.
One of the manifestations of Russian active enterprises is the at-
tempt at pinpoint destabilisation of a given situation in order to 
exert political pressure. One example of this was the creation 
(from September 2015 to February 2016) of individual channels 
of migration from Russia to northern Norway and north-east Fin-
land (most likely with the participation of Russian power struc-
tures and organised crime groups), forcing the authorities of both 
countries to cooperate with the Russian security apparatus. An 
attempt to destabilise the situation in Germany aimed at Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel was a Russian diplomatic-propaganda action 
(the ‘Liza affair’, the use of false information about the disappear-
ance of an underage girl) in January 2016, when statements from 
the Russian Foreign Ministry critical of the German authorities 
were accompanied by local anti-immigrant demonstrations with 
the participation of the Russian diaspora and Russian-speaking 
Germans. The attempt to destabilise the internal situation in 
Montenegro in October 2016 confirms that Russia’s special servic-
es are able to inspire actions resembling preparations for a coup.
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SUmmARy 
The inheRiTAnCe And The PResenT
The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the crisis of the 1990s and 
the change of the European security architecture have not modi-
fied the thinking of the Russian political elite concerning the role 
of the special forces in the political system and the organisation of 
the state. They have not questioned the wisdom of continuing cov-
ert offensive actions aimed at obtaining if not a dominant, then at 
least a significant position for Russia in international relations. 
The definitions of active measures in their counterintelligence 
and intelligence aspects which were cited at the beginning of this 
work include common elements which are worth recalling. These 
are: to build up espionage positions in the camp of the enemy and 
his surroundings, conducting operational games with the enemy, 
his disinformation, discreditation, compromise and demoralisa-
tion, as well as operational actions of espionage aimed at influenc-
ing the foreign policy and the domestic political situation of those 
countries that are the targets of these actions.
Operations conducted by the Russian special services revealed 
during the last decade include:
 – the murder of the former president of Chechnya Zelimkhan 
Yandarbiyev and the former FSB officer Aleksandr Litvi-
nenko;
 – the financing of Russia-friendly foreign political parties and 
social organisations;
 – the expansion of networks of operators distributing disinfor-
mation;
 – destabilising operations to stir up social unrest or disrupt 
democratic procedures, such as parliamentary elections;
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 – operations to discredit countries which adopt an assertive 
posture towards Russia;
 – the dissemination of false information provoking insecurity or 
uncertainty among the societies of other countries, and as a re-
sult, the reduction of support for those countries’ authorities.
These actions demonstrate that the repertoire of ‘active measures’ 
has not undergone any substantial changes. The Russian special 
services continue to plan, organise and carry out long-term spe-
cial operations, whose purpose is to support the Russian govern-
ment’s activities of a diplomatic, political, military, social or eco-
nomic nature.
These operations, as before, are located in the context of a rivalry 
of civilisations: Russia, while supposedly defending its vital inter-
ests, is forced to oppose the ‘aggressive’ West. This also demon-
strates the durability of Russian strategic culture, which is char-
acterised among other things by the primacy of psychological 
and ideological thinking over thinking in terms of pragmatism. 
Moreover, the systematic expansion of a conceptual and execu-
tive support on this basis, as well as the inclusion in the arsenal 
of support for the Russian Federation’s foreign policy of military 
forces and measures, demonstrates that these actions have been 
subordinated to the systemic, permanent, long-term offensive 
strategy of the state.
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